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Abstract 
American politics is becoming increasingly ideologically divided, and this cross-party hostility is 
reflected in pronounced partisan media outrage. However, while actual ideological polarization 
has indeed been rising, people estimate an ideological gap as being even larger than reality. We 
focus on whether part of this cross-party dislike can be explained by illusory perceptions of 
opposing party attitudes, attitudes the majority of the party members do not actually endorse. 
This illusory gap is referred to as false polarization; it is an interpersonal bias where a perceiver 
believes an opponent’s position is much farther away conceptually from where that opponent 
actually reports their position to be. Over three studies, we explore in which instances false 
polarization occurs, as well as the downstream consequences of falsely perceiving opposing 
party attitudes. In Study 1 (N = 1235), we established that liberals and conservatives are likely to 
over-estimate the prevalence of opposing party attitudes when the partisan issues they are 
presented with are extreme, rather than mild. Study 2 (N = 816) replicated these patterns, and 
also revealed that the perception of opponent party agreement with extreme issues correlated 
with cross-party dislike, and unwillingness to engage (starting political discussions, sharing taxis, 
etc.). Additionally, the amount of time participants spent watching partisan media (Fox News or 
MSNBC) positively correlated with the degree of agreement perceived with conservative and 
liberal issues, respectively. In Study 3 (N = 300), false polarization findings were again 
replicated, and we found that participants attributed much of their dislike of opposing party 
members to their perceived (but over-estimated) agreement on extreme issues. As these 
consequences of false polarization pertain to the desire to interact with opposing party members, 
they have the potential to undermine the motivation to work towards communication and 
compromise which are fundamental to the democratic process.  
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The current political climate in the United States (and, increasingly, in other parts of the 
world) is becoming more and more characterized by extremes. Flip to any major American news 
station, and the airwaves will be filled with vitriol and outrage, most often directed at those with 
whom the talking heads strongly disagree, and the public is taking notice. Since the 1980’s, 
Americans’ feelings towards members of the opposing political party have steadily become 
increasingly negative, reaching an all-time low in 2016 (Abramowitz & Webster, 2018). Indeed, 
partisanship has replaced race as an overt and prevalent prejudice. While opposition to interracial 
marriage has dropped to minimal levels, a rising number of both Democrats and Republicans 
indicate that they would be distressed to learn their child planned to marry a person aligned with 
the opponent party (Graham, 2012). What is less clear is whether this growing dislike of political 
opponents is due to irreconcilable differences in values and policy preferences, or whether at 
least some of the polarization is imagined. This reflects a difference between actual political 
polarization (the divide between groups’ actual beliefs and values) and perceived polarization 
(how wide a gap people believe there is). When people believe the gap is larger than it really is, 
they demonstrate false polarization. In the present thesis, I will demonstrate that at least some of 
the polarization between parties is based on the illusory perceptions of the attitudes of the 
opposing party. I argue that some of people’s increasing dislike for members of the opposing 
party is rooted in their belief that a majority of their opponents hold views that most of them 
actually do not hold. I also examine potential processes that both cause and perpetuate this 
phenomenon (e.g., partisan media, willingness to dissent, unwillingness to engage).   
Actual Polarization in the United States 
 Since 1994, Democrats and Republicans have been growing increasingly ideologically 
divided (Suh, 2014). A greater number of Americans report having a consistently liberal or 
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conservative view across a range of issues (size and scope of the government, environmental 
protection policies, etc.) with less and less middle ground between them. This polarization is 
particularly stark among political actors, as US Congress has demonstrated an increasing rift in 
partisan voting patterns (Ingraham, 2015). Up until the 1980’s, Republicans and Democrats 
exhibited similar voting patterns and cross-party cooperation. However, starting in the 1990’s to 
the present, representatives have been steadily moving farther from one another, with cross-party 
cooperation dwindling (and intra-party cooperation rising) and no indication that this pattern will 
cease. Both of these findings suggest that this rift continues to grow. Yet, there is little insight as 
to what the reasons are for this growth are.  
 Is this kind of polarization something that the American public should be concerned 
about? The short answer is “Yes”, as this growing fissure between the politically affiliated 
masses can lead to serious consequences. For example, political partisans are demonstrating 
increased hostility towards one another (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012), a tendency toward 
dehumanizing name-calling (Crawford, Modri, & Motyl, 2013), and are actively separating 
themselves from opposing views both physically and psychologically (Bishop, 2008; Iyengar & 
Westwood, 2014; Motyl et al., 2014). This kind of animosity towards members of the opposing 
political party has the power to threaten the democratic process fundamentally. No one will be 
willing to compromise with someone they view with contempt and derision (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2010).  
 This divide is exacerbated when group identity is considered. Researchers have found 
that since the 1960’s, partisans are increasingly adopting the ideological stance of their party 
leaders (Levendusky, 2010), as voters are taking cues from the party elites to make sense of the 
political landscape. Levendusky found that this was done primarily when elites themselves were 
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polarized. Worse still, a recent study discovered that when partisans were given false information 
about which “side” their political party was taking on a partisan issue (e.g., Republicans 
supporting affirmative action, and Democrats opposing it), they shifted their own ideological 
position on the issue to mirror the position of their party (Luttig, 2018). Similarly, in a study by 
Cohen (2003), participants who were presented with a policy and told their party opposed it 
wrote negative editorials about it; this was compared to participants who were told nothing 
except the policy description (with policy content held constant). These studies suggest that if the 
ideological divide between parties and their leaders continues to grow, even regarding issues that 
may not be ideologically consistent with the party’s stated virtues, politically active Americans 
may feel compelled to polarize right along with them.   
 With actual polarization on the rise, what does this mean for the future of politics in the 
United States? Does this widening ideological divide mean that the chances of finding some 
middle ground are getting smaller and smaller? Not entirely. There has also been the suggestion 
from researchers that although real polarization is occurring (as the PEW Research Center, an 
organization that routinely surveys the American public, has found), at least some of the 
perceived divide is illusory (Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers & Judd, 2015); changes in 
perceived polarization between parties over time track very closely with changes in actual 
polarization. This suggests that partisans may, in fact, be perceiving a greater divide between the 
political parties than actually exists.  
False Polarization 
 Researchers have recently found that the average American citizen perceives a greater 
divide between the parties than actually exists (Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, & Judd, 2015). 
From social services, to the military, participants consistently incorrectly assumed that each party 
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held a more extreme and divided position than they actually did. This misperceived gap is 
referred to as false polarization.  
False polarization is the tendency to over-estimate just how different two groups are from 
each other, especially when it comes to attitudes and behavior (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2015). 
For example, Levendusky and Malhotra, in a study examining false polarization, found that 
participants had a tendency to over-estimate the degree to which Republicans would want capital 
gains taxes reduced (when compared to Republicans who provided their personal opinion), and 
to over-estimate the degree to which Democrats would want them increased (when compared to 
Democrats who provided their personal opinion). False polarization is essentially the gap 
between the actual responses given by Democrats and Republicans, and the estimations of their 
positions. It is an interpersonal bias where a perceiver believes an opponent’s position is much 
farther away conceptually from where that opponent actually reports their position to be (Dawes, 
Singer, & Lemons, 1972; Monin & Norton, 2003). This phenomenon is not necessarily separate 
from actual polarization; the process of perceiving a larger gap between parties may, in fact, 
contribute to actual polarization over time. While only speculative, we believe that the 
perception of a divide that is not there could, indirectly, lead partisans to behave in ways that 
would exacerbate such a divide (such as showing outright inter-party dislike and hostility, 
attempts to avoid confronting or engaging with opposing party members, etc.). Typically, 
researchers (like Monin and Norton) have captured the effect by first obtaining the self-reported 
attitude by one group (in their case, people who had decided to bath during a water ban), and 
compared that to the attitude estimate by others. Levendusky has done something similar as well 
(as previously mentioned), where participants will provide their own position on a political issue, 
and then provide their estimations for the positions of Republicans and Democrats on the same 
Political False Polarization  12 
 
issue. The measured gap between the actual opinion/ position, and the perceived one, is the 
statistical representation of false polarization.  
There has been some debate in the political science literature regarding whether or not 
polarization is indeed increasing or whether that contention is a myth (Abramowitz & Saunders, 
2008; Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2008). One resolution suggests both may be true: partisans 
might be less ideologically divided than they think, but bitterly polarized at an affective level 
nonetheless (Mason, 2015). Largely in line with Mason, we suggest that false polarization may 
contribute to affective polarization (where there is an increase in cross-party animosity). We 
speculate that affective polarization might, at least in some cases, lead to actual ideological 
polarization over time, but this possibility would require further research.  
Previous research has examined several moderators that affect the discrepancy between 
perceived and actual differences in political opinion. For example, whether or not a partisan issue 
is central to one’s political ideology (e.g., social welfare programs for Democrats) will influence 
how far away an individual believes the opposing party’s position to be (Chambers, Baron, & 
Inman, 2006). Perspective-taking (Dimdins, Montgomery, & Austers, 2005) and egocentrism 
(Chambers & De Dreu, 2014) may also be contributing to perceptions of differences between 
individuals’ in-group and out-group. Dimdins and colleagues found that participants receiving 
information from a hypothetical individual in a first-person perspective (as if the individual was 
giving the information from the self) rated that information as more agreeable, positive, and 
well-supported than when the information was framed as coming from a member of an out-
group. Egocentrism, in a similar vein, motivates participants to rely on their own attitudes when 
judging those of others, causing misperceptions of attitude opposition. This, according to 
Chambers and De Dreu, is because individuals think of themselves as completely rational, and 
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believe others in the world are also rational. When differences in attitudes arise, it is taken as an 
indication that the other, and not the self, is biased. Similarly, Nisbett and Kunda (1985) 
discussed the influence of extreme examples, egocentric knowledge of one’s own position, and a 
tendency to over exaggerate differences with out-groups as factors contributing to inaccuracies in 
beliefs about others’ attitudes as well. These findings, taken together, suggest that there are many 
antecedents to discrepancies between perceived and actual differences in opinions and attitudes.  
 This polarization – specifically over-estimating the degree to which an opponent holds a 
particular opinion – may be a misleading basis upon which people come to strongly dislike the 
opposing side, and which may dampen willingness to engage with them in discussion. This 
increased aversion to interaction is likely to keep people polarized, as they miss opportunities to 
learn that their beliefs about the other party are often false. Although researchers have shown that 
perception gaps can affect individuals’ evaluations of out-group members (Chambers & Melnyk, 
2006), there has been little exploration of its downstream consequences, or what can be done to 
mitigate these consequences. Further, while the current literature on false polarization has 
endeavored to explain how people arrive at these misperceptions, little is known about whether it 
contributes to actual polarization over time. It may be the case that the misperception of a wide 
ideological divide may cause partisans to become increasingly extreme in their own ideological 
stances, although this is just speculation and has not yet been tested.  
 To address these gaps, we looked at contemporary American society to account for why 
both actual and false polarization arise in the context of politics. The cognitive and intergroup 
processes that produce polarization and false polarization have been explored (the availability 
heuristic, and out-group homogeneity as examples, which will be discussed further), but these do 
not necessarily examine what the boundary conditions for false polarization are. We sought to 
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consider changes that have been occurring at a societal level, which may in turn influence the 
psychology of group perception and interpersonal factors. One of the most obvious factors 
playing a role in the perceptions of the different political parties and their members, was news 
media representation.  
Differential Exposure to News Stories 
The average American spends 70 minutes a day consuming news (Heimlich, 2010), 
increasingly from their ever-available mobile devices, and websites tailored to their political 
leanings (Mitchell, Gottfried, Barthel, & Shearer, 2016). This means that American citizens are 
getting constantly exposed to a variety of ideas, stories, and reports, often gravitating towards 
and sharing pieces coming from sources that align with their preconceived views (Garrett, 2009; 
Knobloch-Westerwick & Lavis, 2017). However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that individuals 
are being exposed to a variety of issues in equal proportions, nor are they being exposed to more 
than one perspective on those issues. 
Starting, arguably, with the increasingly partisan leaning of Fox News (Brock & Rabin-
Havt, 2012) in the mid-1990s, some news sources have become more and more partisan, and a 
host of commentators and talk radio shows have contributed to this phenomenon. People who 
prefer to consume media with a partisan leaning are likely to be exposed to reporting with a 
particular focus. More concerning, some news media has increasingly adopted a model of 
selectively reporting particularly egregious incidents coming out of the opponent party. This is 
problematic, as exposure to extreme stories has been shown to exacerbate polarization, with 
effects lasting several days (Levendusky, 2013). Describing this phenomenon as “the outrage 
industry,” Berry and Sobieraj (2013) explore this style of reporting and some of its potential 
consequences from a sociological perspective. They argue that there is a tendency for partisan 
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media to report heavily on much more extreme attitudes and behaviours aligned with opponent 
party members, potentially giving viewers the false impression that these attitudes and 
behaviours are far more prevalent than they actually are (Berry & Sobieraj, 2013). The more 
egregious issues are often framed as the next major crisis, despite occurring relatively rarely; one 
need only to Google the term “Free speech on American campuses”, or “Racism since Trump 
election” to see the endless articles written about only a few instances of shutting down 
controversial speakers or discriminatory incidents, framed in a way that suggests that this is the 
next threat to civilization as we know it. There appears to be a difference in proportional 
coverage; something like healthcare or tax reform are topics relevant to everyone, whereas 
violent protests on campuses, or a business’s refusal to serve an immigrant, are relatively rare 
and affect only a small portion of the population. Additionally, some topics are easier to frame in 
extreme ways than others; Molotov cocktails inspire outrage, while healthcare reform does not 
(or at least, not to the same extent). The more vivid the coverage, the more viewers will 
remember the story.  
Consumers also play a role in the diffusion of egregious headlines, ideas, and messages. 
Researchers have recently found that using moral-emotional language in social media posts (e.g., 
contempt at the injustices committed against others) increases their transmission across platforms 
by up to 20% per word (Brady et al., 2017). Americans may be receiving their morally outraged 
news from sources other than major networks, as their friends and family (and others they are 
connected to via social media) may be unwittingly spreading outrage from the comfort of their 
own Twitter and Facebook pages.   
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Heuristics and Biases in Information Processing, and Attitude Formation 
What could this kind of exposure be doing to the American public psychologically? How 
is it affecting their judgement of others, or the way they process the information they are 
receiving? Imagine the typical liberal, scrolling through MSNBC’s newsfeed on their smart 
phone, and seeing links to articles highlighting the particularly deplorable or bigoted views and 
behaviours of conservatives. Or, alternatively, envision the typical conservative viewing Fox 
news’ coverage of liberal snowflakes’ violent and censorious attacks on conservative speakers, 
and unjust instances of affirmative action. Because the media may push the most extreme and 
egregious stories and events into the attentional field of individuals at a rate out of proportion 
with their occurrence (Berry & Sobieraj, 2013), there are a number of psychological mechanisms 
that can lead people to believe that these events are more prevalent than they actually are. For 
example, the availability heuristic is a psychological shortcut that results in information that is 
most readily available informing the perceived frequency of events, or the perceived likelihood 
those events will occur again (Gabrielcik & Fazio, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Even 
imagining or visualizing an event, a process facilitated by watching similar events unfold on the 
news, can lead participants to have greater expectations that those events will occur (Carroll, 
1978). In the case of the everyday American, this could mean that hearing various news stations 
cover the same outrageous, but rare or one-off events (ranging from Alt-Right marches to violent 
Berkley protests) could lead them to over-estimate the frequency of these events, and may foster 
the prediction that such events will continue to be prevalent in the future since the information 
about them is easily accessible from memory.  
Exposure (and the heuristics that follow) is not the only cognitive mechanism at play 
here. People are not passive consumers of media but actively select their chosen information. 
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The Pew Research Center examined thousands of Americans, and found that those who aligned 
themselves politically with the left gravitated towards left-leaning news sources and found them 
to be more trustworthy than news sources from the right (and vice-versa for participants aligning 
themselves with the political right; Mitchell, Gottfried, Kiley, & Matsa, 2014). This differential 
trust of media may further skew people’s attention to information aligned with their partisan 
preferences and to distrust and perhaps disregard any information that disconfirms their 
preference interpretation – an instantiation of classic confirmation bias processes (Flaxman, 
Goel, & Rao, 2013; Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman, 2011; 
Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2015; Nickerson, 1998).   
The main implication of this actively biased selection of media sources is that people will 
not be exposed to all outrageous acts across party lines at a similar rate: partisan media will 
highlight the outrageous actions of the other side but not their own. If people are especially likely 
to see stories about the other side behaving badly, the psychological processes at play also 
involve intergroup psychology. Specifically, because these stories pertain to an out-group, people 
may be prone to out-group homogeneity effects (Park & Rothbart, 1982; Rubin & Badea, 2012). 
This phenomenon reflects the tendency to assume members of an out-group are more similar to 
one another than members of one’s in-groups (who are viewed as more heterogeneous). If this is 
the case, then exposure to extreme and egregious attitudes would colour people’s assumptions 
about the out-group as a whole. For instance, being exposed to a few racist incidents perpetrated 
by conservatives may color one’s perception of conservatives as a group, contributing to an 
automatic assumption that any conservative they meet is likely to be deplorable and bigoted. 
This perception is considerably attenuated when encountering information about in-group 
members, because people perceive their in-groups as more heterogeneous. Additionally, 
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researchers in the stereotyping literature have found that individuals encode stereotype-consistent 
information more effectively when it pertains to the out-group, and stereotype-inconsistent 
information more effectively when it pertains to the in-group, suggesting that individuals are 
more willing to accept variation and heterogeneity that strays outside of a stereotype for their in-
group (Koomen & Dijker, 1997).   
Further, should an individual come across damaging information regarding an in-group 
member, they may label the individual in question as a “Black Sheep” of sorts, acting as an 
individual separately from the in-group (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988).  
This increased exposure to extreme and egregious news, combined with the 
psychological mechanisms that lead people to inflate the prevalence of these events (especially 
among out-group members), sets the stage for intergroup conflict. Partisans may become more 
likely to view their political opponent as an adversary with extreme and unwavering opinions, 
instead of someone open to level-headed discussion- possibly reducing their inclination to 
engage with these opponents at all. If partisans go into interactions with opposing party members 
with the impression that they hold extreme and unwavering opinions, they may be disinclined to 
engage with them at all.  
Voicing Dissent 
A final potential consequence of this process is what has been called the “spiral of 
silence” (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Taylor, 1982). The “spiral of silence” is a theory that examines 
how the perception of public political opinion motivates an individual to share (or, in some 
cases, not share) their own thoughts on the topic. The theory suggests that if someone believes 
their opinion is in the majority, they feel more comfortable speaking out, however if they believe 
they are in the minority, they will remain silent. This is because individuals fear the potential 
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social isolation that may be invoked should they choose to share an opinion that is perceived to 
be held by a minority. The problem is that if an individual believes that their in-group holds a 
particular opinion to a greater extent than they actually do, they may begin to believe their own 
dissenting opinion is actually part of the minority (even when it isn’t). That individual’s 
subsequent decision to remain silent may perpetuate the perception (to both in-group and out-
group members) that the majority of the group holds that opinion. When that opinion is 
something as egregious as, for example, outright racism, the decision not to express a dissenting 
opinion may contribute to false perceptions of agreement from the opposing side.  
Hypotheses 
False Polarization We hypothesized that false polarization would emerge when 
individuals were asked to estimate the prevalence of agreement from the opposing political party 
on issues framed in extreme and egregious ways, to mirror the reporting style seen in the media. 
We did not think that this would be the case for mild issues, but rather that opposing parties 
would be relatively accurate in their predictions of agreement. We expected both liberals and 
conservatives to over-estimate the prevalence of extreme (but not mild) attitudes of the opponent 
party particularly. We thought it was possible that people would also over-estimate the 
prevalence of extreme partisan issues for their own group, but did not have a strong hypothesis 
about the strength of this effect. People are likely to be aware of the publicized examples of 
extreme behaviour from their own party (possibly contributing to some over-estimation), but are 
likely to be exposed to these negative stories about their group less frequently, and may not be as 
prone to over-generalize negative actions to their entire group (likely detracting from the extent 
of over-estimation).  
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Additionally, we hypothesize that exposure to partisan media (Fox News and MSNBC in 
particular, as those are often heavily associated with the right and left respectively) will correlate 
with over-estimations of extreme attitudes, because these unflattering portrayals of the opponent 
party are likely to appear more frequently in partisan media. As mild issues are typically not as 
outrage-inducing as extreme ones, we do not expect that exposure to partisan media will predict 
these estimations. Specifically, we hypothesized that greater reported viewing of MSNBC will be 
correlated with greater perceptions of liberal agreement with extreme and egregious liberal 
issues, while greater reported viewing of Fox News will be correlated with greater perceptions of 
conservative agreement with extreme and egregious conservative issues. 
 Our classification requires some elaboration. Here we are defining “extreme” and 
“egregious” issues as ones that typically incite moral outrage when reported in the manner that 
we typically find featured in the media during the time this research was conducted (such as free-
speech restrictions on college campuses, or racist discrimination toward immigrants in the USA). 
The issues we selected were drawn from our observations of current public discourse and, as a 
result, sacrifice experimental control in favour of current relevance. We recognize that because 
issue topics differ across mild and extreme conditions, and because “extremity” and 
“egregiousness” are confounded with topic itself, we cannot define these variables with a 
satisfying degree of precision. We suspect that these extreme and egregious issues are perceived 
as moral infractions increasing their incendiary impact, which may be the reason that partisan 
media gravitates towards these topics for disproportionate levels of reporting (as the more 
incendiary a topic, the greater the readership/ viewership). We recognize that “extreme” could 
refer to a variety of characteristics, however, including some that would call into question the 
current definition (for example, lack of access to healthcare could have consequences far more 
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extreme for many Americans that occasional instances of individual bigotry or censorship). As a 
result, we also emphasize that we deliberately framed the mild issues using fairly generic policy 
language (universal health care, taxation policy), while using more incendiary framing for 
extreme issues.1    
 We also recognize that the distinctions we’ve made here, and our use of the terms “mild” 
and “extreme” are not ideal. As mentioned, there are a number of features that can be considered 
when deciding whether an issue is categorized as mild or extreme. Our use of these terms was 
partially informed by our own observations of the current discourse around partisan issues, and 
how that discourse is framed in media. Issues that are heavily reported, especially salient, or 
largely controversial have these features. However, which of these is the key feature that makes 
an issue mild or extreme is less clear.2  
 Lastly, we wanted to clarify that when we refer to partisan “issues”, we are specifically 
referring to the perceived and reported attitudes towards those issues. We selected “partisan 
issues” where dominant issue support seemed associated with either the liberals or the 
conservatives; as such, when we explain results for “liberal issues” or “conservative issues”, we 
are specifically referring to issues where liberals or conservatives tend to have a dominant 
positive view. We do not suggest the issues “belong” only to one party: the opposing political 
side will also have an attitude towards each of these issues.  
                                                          
1 It is worth noting that some “mild” issues could be framed in a more outrage-inducing manner (for example, 
reports of “death panels” as a part of Obamacare or reports about NRA complicity in school shootings as a part of 
gun rights).  This approach (framing the same issue as mild or extreme) would be a desirable step for future 
research.  
2 Some committee members suggested other terminologies to categorize these events, such as “rare,” “salient,” 
“moralized,” or “controversial.” Each suggestion has merit but none perfectly capture the distinction. Because 
“mild/extreme” was used in the research conceptualization and was measured in manipulation checks, we will 
continue to use “mild/extreme” while recognizing the terms’ insufficiency.  
Political False Polarization  22 
 
Voicing Opinions We also hypothesized, as per the suggestions of the theory of the 
“spiral of silence”, that participants will be less likely to voice their opinion on own-party 
partisan issues when those issues are framed in extreme and egregious ways. In other words, 
liberal participants will be less willing to voice their opinion on extreme liberal issues than mild 
ones, while conservative participants will be less willing to voice their opinion on extreme 
conservative issues than mild ones. This prediction is contingent on the earlier prediction that 
relatively few partisans will actually support extreme views (thus voicing would often mean 
expressing dissent), yet they may not recognize how few of their in-group actually agree. People 
may hesitate to dissent because of a fear of being rejected by their partisan in-group for their 
views.  
Cross-Party Dislike and Unwillingness to Engage We also hypothesized that over-
estimation of opposing party agreement with extreme opinions would be correlated with greater 
reported dislike of members of the opposing party, as well as a decreased willingness to engage 
with them in various ways (e.g., having a discussion, shaking their hand, etc.).  
 Finally, we hypothesized that, when asked, individuals would attribute more of their 
reported dislike of opposing party members to their perceived stance on extreme issues (a 
position they may not actually hold) than their perceived stance on mild issues, as we believe it is 
the falsely perceived agreement with extreme issues that is driving much of the cross-party 
dislike.  
Study 1 
In Study 1, the primary goal was to determine whether false polarization only occurred 
when participants were presented with what we have conceptualized as extreme partisan issues, 
and not what we have conceptualized as mild ones. We believe that this is because the extreme 
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issues are the ones that often get the most media attention, and participants are therefore exposed 
to polarizing information in their day-to-day via their preferred news outlets. With this in mind, 
extreme issues presented in the study were framed in a way that mirrored how they are portrayed 
in the media; this was done to better capture the “version” of the extreme liberal and 
conservative that are often depicted in the news, and what we believe is largely contributing to 
the perception that more liberals and conservatives agree with extreme positions than actually do.  
 In addition, we also examined how this polarization was related to how likely participants 
were to voice their opinion on the issue they were presented with.   
Method 
Participants We tested an American sample from Mechanical Turk (N = 1235) ages 18 
and above. Because our design included 4 conditions - Issue (Liberal, Conservative) x Type 
(Mild, Extreme) - and aimed to collect a sufficient number of liberals and conservatives to each 
condition, we aimed for a sample of at least 1000 participants, to ensure that our samples per cell 
were large enough to compare meaningfully. We collected additional participants with the 
assumption that some would be excluded because they did not identify as either liberal or 
conservative.  
Participants were asked how they aligned themselves politically. 31.4% supported the 
Republicans, 48.5% supported the Democrats, 9.9% supported the Libertarians, 5% supported 
the Green party, and 5% were classified as “other” (often self-reporting that they were 
independent). For ease of analysis, we also asked participants whether they would classify 
themselves as more conservative (n = 383), more liberal (n = 690), or both equally (n = 162) on 
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most societal issues3. We decided to ask people to classify as liberal or conservative rather than 
simply relying on party affiliation for a few reasons. First, we suspected that some people would 
identify with mainly liberal or conservative values, but might not currently identify with the 
corresponding party (for example, if people are disillusioned about party politics or disapprove 
of current leadership). Second, we expected that some other-party members (e.g., Green, 
Libertarian, those who previously identified as Tea Party supporters) might self-categorize as 
mostly liberal or conservative, increasing the potentially useable sample size. Finally, and 
importantly, we used the terms liberal and conservative to describe the societal attitudes we 
assess, rather than affiliating them with a specific party. Although some of the issues (e.g., 
taxation, health care) are linked to party policy and explicit political platforms, others are more 
informally associated with the party (e.g., racism, free speech). Especially in their extreme form, 
it would be misleading to suggest that the attitudes are akin to political policy positions (e.g., no 
Republican policy encourages the overt racial discrimination mentioned in one issue; no 
Democrat policy encourages overt censorship of offensive positions as described in another 
extreme item, but both issues can be evaluated in terms of how often liberals and conservatives 
hold the views. We provided a definition of liberal as anyone who votes Democrat, Green, or 
generally supports liberal policies, and conservative as anyone who votes Republican, has 
supported the Tea Party, or generally supports conservative policies (and noted that Libertarians 
might support some but not other conservative views). The definition was left partially 
ambiguous so that participants could define it for themselves to some degree.  
                                                          
3 As we were asking participants specifically about their own position on a social issue, as well as the position of 
liberals and conservatives on that same social issue, we felt that their self-reported political alignment was a 
sufficient indicator of party affiliation.  
Political False Polarization  25 
 
Because our hypotheses focus on partisan differences in perceptions, only participants 
who self-categorized as mostly liberal or mostly conservative (n = 1073) were included in 
analyses; those who reported being both equally represented 13% of the data and were excluded. 
Not only was the “both equally” category irrelevant to a priori hypotheses, its n was too small to 
meaningfully analyse by condition. 
Procedure After obtaining consent, participants were provided with brief definitions of 
the words “Liberal” and “Conservative” (see Appendix A for definitions and full study 
materials). This was to ensure all participants were working from the same conceptualization of 
the terms when asked about these groups, and categorizing themselves as one or the other. Then, 
participants reported their political affiliation. Following this, they answered exploratory 
personality questions (the NPI).  
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions; Mild Liberal, Mild 
Conservative, Extreme Liberal, and Extreme Conservative. In each condition, participants were 
presented with a partisan issue, which was broken down further into two parts (one asking about 
agreement with the attitude, and another about agreement with corresponding actions). We aimed 
to select “mild” issues, based on informal assessment of media coverage, that could be 
considered fairly low extremity and commonplace (e.g., people have opinions on health 
insurance that vary across parties but the typical framing of these opinions does not come across 
as extreme or egregious, just as differences of opinion4). Issues selected as extreme were deemed 
more severe, and rarely-endorsed, and were also framed in a way that emphasised the issue’s 
egregiousness. The framing was deliberately chosen to mimic how the issue might be framed in 
                                                          
4 It should be noted that gun rights became considerably more controversial in public discourse following the 
Stoneman Douglas high school shooting. This study was conducted prior to that event. 
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partisan media. Because this study had a between-subjects design, participants were only 
presented with one issue. 
Participants (both liberal and conservative) in the Mild Liberal Issue condition were 
asked about their opinions regarding “Universal Healthcare provided by the government”, and 
signing petitions that support it. In the Mild Conservative condition, participants were asked 
about “the right to purchase and own guns, in accordance with the Second Amendment”, and 
protesting stricter gun control laws. In the Extreme Liberal condition, participants were asked 
whether “…controversial (often conservative) public figures who may be offensive to oppressed 
groups should be banned from speaking on college campuses”, and engaging in violent protests 
to support this. Lastly, in the Extreme Conservative condition, participants were asked about 
“…expressing hostile and unwelcoming attitudes toward those of Latino/Hispanic or Middle 
Eastern background” and engaging in blatant discrimination and harassment against them.  
In each condition, participants were asked to first rate their degree of personal agreement. 
They were then asked to estimate the degree of agreement of both liberals and conservatives 
regarding the issue, on the same scale. Finally, they were asked to estimate what percentage of 
liberals and conservatives “at least somewhat agreed” with the partisan issue presented. 
Participants were then asked how likely they would be to voice their opinion on the partisan 
issue they were presented with, as well as how likely liberals and conservatives would be to 
voice their opinion. 
Next, all participants filled out the Social Vigilantism Scale, the Comprehensive 
Intellectual Humility Scale, the Collective Narcissism Scale, and the Modern Racism Scale. 
These were primarily exploratory, and will not be reported in this manuscript (please see Table 1 
for results where liberals and conservatives are compared).  
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Participants then estimated what percentage of their online and in-person social circles 
was made up of both conservatives and liberals; again, this measure was exploratory, and beyond 
the scope of this thesis, therefore will not be discussed further.  
After this, all participants answered questions regarding their media consumption. 
Specifically, participants were provided with the list of news stations (and could input one of 
their own), and asked to select all the stations they watched. Following this, participants were 
asked to estimate how much time they spent reading online news, engaging with social media, 
and participating on online discussion boards.  
Lastly, participants completed standard demographics questions (age, gender, race, 
religious beliefs, highest level of education, and annual household income), and were 
subsequently debriefed and compensated.  
Materials All of the participants completed the survey online, which included the 
following measures. 
Personal Agreement Participants were presented with a description of a partisan issue, 
and asked to rate on a scale of (1) Strongly Disagree to (7) Strongly Agree the degree to which 
they agreed.   
Other Agreement To assess the degree to which participants believed members of 
different political parties agreed with these same partisan issues, participants were asked the 
same question two different ways. First, they were asked to rate the degree to which both liberals 
and conservatives agreed with the partisan issue, on a scale of (1) Strongly Disagree, to (7) 
Strongly Agree. Then, they were asked to estimate the percentage of both liberals and 
conservatives who at least somewhat agree with the partisan issue, on a sliding scale ranging 
from 0% to 100%. This wording was chosen intentionally, as it reflects the “agree” scale points 
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of the Personal Agreement question. In past literature, this has been assessed using difference 
scores, subtracting perceived polarization (which was the difference between perceived 
Democrat and Republican positions on a given issue) from actual polarization (which were the 
mean agreement scores from participants) (Westfall et. al, 2015). The method we have proposed 
allows us to determine the proportion of liberals and conservatives who agree (based on their 
self-reported party affiliation), and then compare that to perceived party agreement, instead of 
just the size of the difference.   
Voicing Opinion We also wanted to determine whether participants would be likely to 
voice their opinions on the social issues we asked them about. We believe this is part of the 
perpetuation of false polarization; if party members aren’t expressing dissenting opinions, the 
opposing party has no reason to believe that anyone disagrees. To assess this, participants were 
asked to rate the likelihood that they would voice their opinion on the partisan issue that they 
were presented with on a scale ranging from (1) Extremely Unlikely, to (7) Extremely Likely. 
Additionally, they were asked to rate the likelihood that Liberals and Conservatives would voice 
their opinions on the issue (specifically if they disagreed) on the same scale.  
Media Consumption At the end of the survey, participants were asked to read a list of 
television news stations, and to check-off the ones that they typically watch. This list consisted 
of ABC News, Bloomberg Television, CBS News, CNBC, CNN, Fox News, HLN, MSNBC, 
NBC News, and “Other” (where they could input stations that were not listed). Additionally, 
participants were asked how much time a day (ranging from 1-30 minutes, to More Than 7 
Hours) they spent on social media, reading online news, and browsing online discussion boards.  
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Results 
False Polarization To assess whether false polarization was occurring, the analyses were 
done two ways. First, we calculated a percentage prevalence for how many self-identified 
liberals and conservatives at least somewhat agreed with each issue, and compared those 
prevalence rates to liberals’ and conservatives’ estimates of prevalence. To obtain these 
estimates, we conducted frequency analyses for liberals and conservatives separately for each 
issue. Secondly, we determined the overall percentage of liberals and conservative who 
personally agreed with each issue by calculating the percentage of participants who scored 
between 5 (somewhat agree) and 7 (strongly agree). This percentage corresponds to the 
prevalence estimation question participants were asked (they were asked to estimate the 
percentage of liberals and conservatives who “at least somewhat agree” with each of the issues). 
This allowed us to compare an “actual” percentage agreement with the same participants’ 
estimates of partisan agreement. One-sample t-tests were run to make meaningful comparisons 
between the percentage of liberals and conservatives who actually agreed, and the percentage 
estimates they made about partisan groups (please see Table 2 for complete agreement 
percentages).  
 Recall that we expected to see false polarization especially in the extreme conditions, and 
more minimally or not at all in the mild conditions. In the Mild Liberal condition, 95% of 
liberals personally agreed with universal healthcare provided by the government, and 88% of 
liberals personally agreed with signing petitions in support of it. Conservatives, when asked to 
estimate liberal agreement, believed that 80% of liberals at least somewhat agreed with universal 
healthcare (t(97) = -7.93, p < .001, 95% CI [-19.21, -11.52]), and that 75% of liberals at least 
somewhat agreed with signing petitions to that effect (t(97) = -6.67, p < .001, 95% CI [-16.32, -
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8.84]). While the differences between actual reported liberal agreement and conservative 
estimates are significant, it is important to note that this is not false polarization. Conservatives 
are largely correct in their assumptions that the majority of liberals agree with these issues, and 
the significant difference is actually one of under-estimation (the opposite of what a false 
polarization effect would reveal). This pattern is broadly consistent with hypotheses (predicting 
that false polarization would not be especially evident in the mild condition), but the slight 
reversal was unpredicted. It is unclear whether the under-estimation reflects a psychological 
process of interest; it may appear because actual agreement is so close to ceiling.   
 Among those assigned to the Mild Conservative condition, similar patterns were found. 
Here, 92% of conservatives personally agreed with the right to own and use guns, and 66% 
agreed with protesting stricter gun control laws. Liberals, when asked to estimate conservative 
agreement, believed that 77% of conservatives at least somewhat agreed with gun rights (t(170) 
= -9.87, p < .001, 95% CI [-18.42, -12.28]), and that 60% agreed with protesting stricter gun 
control (t(171) = -2.72, p = .007, 95% CI [-10.12, -1.60]). Again, this is not false polarization, as 
liberals are quite accurate in their estimations of conservative agreement, again with some 
systematic under-estimation.   
 As predicted, the extreme conditions are where false polarization becomes apparent. In 
the Extreme Liberal condition, 34% of liberals personally agree that controversial speakers 
should be banned from college campuses, while 17% agree with violently protesting against 
them. Conservatives, when asked to estimate liberal agreement, believed that 63% of liberals at 
least somewhat agree with banning controversial speakers (t(93) = 9.89, p < .001, 95% CI 
[22.95, 34.48]), and that 55% at least somewhat agree with protesting violently for that cause 
(t(93) = 13.16, p < .001, 95% CI [32.22, 43.67]). In this case, there is a 29% and 38% over-
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estimation, in contrast to the 13% and 15% under-estimation in the Mild Liberal condition. This 
gap in perception, between what liberals personally report, and what conservatives believe 
liberals endorse, is false polarization.  
 The Extreme Conservative condition shows the same pattern, consistent with hypotheses. 
Here, 22% of conservatives personally agree with expressing hostile and unwelcoming attitudes 
towards those of Latino/Hispanic and Middle Eastern backgrounds, and 13% agree with actively 
discriminating against them. When asked to estimate conservative agreement, liberals believed 
that 57% of conservatives at least somewhat agreed with hostility towards those of 
Latino/Hispanic and Middle Eastern backgrounds (t(175) = 20.10, p < .001, 95% CI [31.57, 
38.44]), and that 46% at least somewhat agree with discrimination against them (t(174) = 17.20, 
p < .001, 95% CI [29.51, 37.16]). Again, here there is a 35% and 33% over-estimation, compared 
to the 15% and 6% under-estimation in the mild condition. 
False Polarization: Mean Comparisons The second method that we can use to examine 
false polarization in this study is to conduct a 2 Affiliation (Liberal, Conservative) x 2 Issue 
(Liberal, Conservative) x 2 Type (Mild, Extreme) repeated measures analysis with agreement as 
the DV, to determine if a predicted 3-way interaction emerges. However, a typical 2 x 2 x 2 
ANOVA as outlined would not test the comparisons we are most interested in. For example, one 
could compare estimated liberal agreement with mild issues with estimated conservative 
agreement with mild issues, and so on – but couldn’t compare the relevant means – liberals’ 
personal agreement with conservatives’ estimates of liberal agreement, etc. As a result, we 
restructured the data and conducted targeted analyses on the relevant comparisons (please see 
Table 3 and Table 4 for a complete list of means).  
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 A separate analysis was conducted to allow for targeted comparisons of interest. 
Specifically we compared individuals’ personal agreement scores, and the opponent’s estimated 
agreement for participants’ partisan group. For example, in reorganizing the data set, we were 
able to compare liberal personal agreement with conservatives’ estimates of what liberals believe 
in the mild and extreme liberal conditions (and the same set of comparisons for the conservative 
conditions). These analyses were conducted for agreement with attitudes and with behavior.  
 We first focused on the attitudes scores in the liberal conditions. When running a 
between-subjects ANOVA, there was a significant 2-way interaction between Views on Liberals 
(a variable that contained liberals’ personal agreement scores, liberals’ views on liberals, and 
conservatives’ views on liberals) and extremity (either the mild or extreme liberal condition), 
F(2,407) = 17.50, p < .001, η2 = .079. In the mild liberal condition, liberals’ personal agreement 
scores for attitudes about healthcare (M = 6.45, SD = 1.00) were significantly higher than 
conservatives’ estimates (M = 5.84, SD = 1.31), p = .024. There were no significant differences 
between liberals’ estimates of other liberals, liberals’ personal agreement scores, or 
conservatives’ estimates. This indicates a significant under-estimation is being made by 
conservatives when asked to think about mild liberal attitudes. 
In the extreme liberal condition, the gap between liberals’ personal agreement scores, and 
conservative estimates was much larger, in the opposite (and hypothesized) direction. Liberals’ 
personal agreement scores regarding attitudes about restricting freedom of speech (M = 3.17, SD 
= 1.85) were significantly lower than conservative estimates of liberals’ views (M = 4.88, SD = 
1.74), p < .001. This difference is indicative of false polarization; conservatives believe that 
liberals agree with restricting freedom of speech much more than they actually do. Additionally, 
liberals’ estimates of other liberals (M = 3.83, SD = 1.75) was significantly greater than liberals’ 
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personal agreement scores (p = .005), and significantly lower than conservatives’ estimates (p < 
.001). This shows that liberals are also overestimating the agreement of other liberals, but less so 
than the conservative participants’ estimates.  
We then looked at the attitudes scores in the conservative conditions. A similar between-
subjects ANOVA was run, and again, there was a significant 2-way interaction between Views 
on Conservatives (a variable that contained conservatives’ personal agreement scores, 
conservatives’ views on conservatives, and liberals’ views on conservatives) and extremity 
(either the mild or extreme conservative condition), F(2,339) = 10.54, p < .001, η2 = .059. In the 
mild conservative condition, there were no significant differences between conservatives’ 
personal agreement scores for attitudes about gun rights (M = 6.14, SD = 1.05) when compared 
with both conservatives’ estimates of other conservatives (M = 6.09, SD = 1.24, p = ns), or 
liberals’ estimates of conservatives (M = 5.82, SD = 1.34, p = ns).  
In the extreme conservative condition, as predicted, the gap between conservatives’ 
personal agreement scores, and liberal estimates was significant. Conservatives’ personal 
agreement scores regarding discriminating against immigrants (M = 3.32, SD = 1.76) were 
significantly lower than liberal estimates (M = 4.58, SD = 1.61), p < .001. Again, this difference 
is indicative of false polarization; liberals believe that conservatives agree with discriminating 
against immigrants much more than they actually do. Additionally, conservatives’ estimates of 
other conservatives (M = 3.47, SD = 1.86) did not differ significantly from conservatives’ 
personal agreement (p = ns), but were significantly lower than liberal estimates, p < .001.  
These analyses were also run for the personal agreement and estimate scores for the 
action portion of each condition, and the false polarization patterns were replicated.  
Political False Polarization  34 
 
Voicing Opinion To determine whether political affiliation and condition were 
predicting the willingness of participants to voice their opinions on the partisan issues, we ran a 2 
x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, with Type (mild or extreme) and Issue (Liberal or 
Conservative) as the within-subjects factors, and Affiliation (Liberal or Conservative) as the 
between-subjects factor, to determine whether these factors predicted the likelihood of 
participants voicing their opinions on the partisan issues.  
 We found a significant 3-way interaction between type, issue, and affiliation, F(1,1056) = 
18.78, p < .001, η2 = .017. Looking at the pairwise comparisons for conservative participants, we 
see that they are significantly more willing to voice their opinion on mild conservative issues (M 
= 4.99, SD = 1.49) than they are extreme conservative issues (M = 4.48, SD = 1.78) (p = .043). In 
other words, a conservative will be more willing to speak out about gun rights than they are 
racial discrimination. Additionally, conservatives are just as likely to voice their opinion on mild 
liberal issues (M = 4.64, SD = 1.71) as they are extreme liberal ones (M = 4.44, SD = 1.95) (p = 
ns).  For liberal participants, they are, similarly, significantly more willing to voice their opinion 
on mild liberal issues (M = 5.25, SD = 1.55) than they are extreme liberal ones (M = 4.48, SD = 
1.58) (p < .001). Additionally, liberals are also more likely to voice their opinion on extreme 
conservative issues (M = 5.41, SD = 1.51) than mild ones (M = 4.70, SD = 1.61) (p < .001).  
 These analyses suggest that participants are at least somewhat more disinclined to voice 
their opinion on extremely framed issues, relative to mild ones, and especially for those attitudes 
pertinent to their party. This matters, because people have more polarized misconceptions about 
extreme issues, and if people fail to voice the dissenting views that might challenge those 
misconceptions, this may reinforce the cycle of false polarization by inhibiting processes of 
correction. 
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Media Consumption In this study, media consumption was recorded using a 
dichotomous variable. Participants were presented with a list of news stations in a check-box 
format, and checked off stations that they watched. If the box was checked, it was coded as 1, 
and if it was not, it was coded as 0. Because of this, analyses beyond descriptive information was 
not conducted, as we would not be able to draw meaningful conclusions by correlating what they 
watched, with their perceptions of opposing political party members (as this does not account for 
the amount watched, or the frequency of viewing).  
  When asked about whether participants watched Fox News, 61.4% of conservatives did, 
while only 14.1% of liberals reported doing so. When asked about whether participants watched 
MSNBC, only 10.7% of conservatives did, while 30% of liberals reported doing so.  
 In subsequent research (Study 2), we made the decision to focus exclusively on Fox 
News as the primary conservative network, and MSNBC as the primary liberal network, as the 
journalism literature has often presented them as such (Berry & Sobieraj, 2013; Lisheron, 2007; 
Meirick, 2012). Additionally, on a continuum, MSNBC has been listed as the most liberal of the 
cable news networks, and Fox News as the most conservative (Blake, 2014).   
Online and In-Person Social Circles Though not included in the primary analysis, we 
did examine what proportion of individuals’ online and in-person social circles consisted of 
liberals and conservatives. Please see Table 5 for complete percentages. Both liberals and 
conservatives reported a larger proportion of their social circles who held like-minded views than 
diverging ones.   
Study 1 Discussion 
 Our primary hypothesis was supported; participants showed false polarization when 
making estimations about the opposing political party’s attitudes on extreme issues (framed in 
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ways that reflect media portrayal), and not mild ones. Liberals believed that the majority of 
conservatives agreed with racist and discriminatory attitudes and actions, when in reality, less 
than a quarter of them reported even somewhat agreeing with them. Similarly, conservatives 
believed the majority of liberals agreed with banning free speech, when in reality, only a third 
even somewhat did. We attempted a preliminary assessment of some societal and interpersonal 
factors that might contribute to these patterns. First, we theorized that part of the reason for an 
over-perception of extreme attitudes may be to the tendency for partisan media to highlight these 
egregious, outrage-producing incidents. The Outrage Industry (Berry & Sobieraj, 2013) 
highlights how partisan media actively sought rare but outrageous incidents to repeat with 
unrepresentative frequency. We speculated that participants who consume more partisan media 
(defined as Fox and MSNBC) might have starker prevalence misconceptions for egregious 
events. Due to the method in which we collected news consumption information, we could 
establish that partisans did report different consumption of these networks, but were unable to 
directly examine a link between media consumption frequency and polarized views of 
opponents. This shortcoming will be addressed in the next study.  
 Also of interest, though not our primary concern, was the degree of over-estimation 
found when participants estimated the agreement of their own party with extreme issues. 
Partisans are not completely insulated from the portrayals of their in-group by the opposing side, 
and thus may be making their estimations with these stereotypes in mind. However, these over-
estimations of agreement by in-group members were still significantly lower than the estimations 
of agreement made by the opposing party members (please see Table 6 and 7 for over-estimation 
means and t-tests). This pattern will be further explored in the general discussion.   
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Additionally, we found that participants are less willing to voice their opinion on extreme 
issues that are politically congruent with their political affiliation; liberals are less willing to 
voice their opinion on restricting freedom of speech than universal healthcare, and conservatives 
are less willing to voice their opinion on racist actions than nationwide gun rights. 
 This means that while participants are holding these incorrect assumptions about one 
another, they are also not providing the opposing political party with the correct information 
about their actual stance on the egregious issues (as they are not speaking up). This, then, could 
be perpetuating a cycle of misinformation, thus exacerbating false polarization.  
Study 2  
 In Study 1, we selected only one issue to represent mild vs extreme for each party. Our 
intuitions about extremity (and observations of media coverage) guided the selections. Further, 
extremity framing was deliberately built into the phrasing so that mild events seemed mundane 
and reasonable relative to the more incendiary wording of extreme items. However, no 
manipulation check of extremity was obtained. Additionally, information regarding media 
consumption was relatively impoverished, barring us from making meaningful conclusions about 
how viewing certain stations might correlate with assumptions about opposing party members. In 
Study 2, our goal was not only to replicate the false polarization findings of Study 1, but to 
address these shortcomings by adding more issues in each (mild and extreme) partisan category, 
a manipulation check for extremity, and more detailed questions regarding media consumption. 
We also wanted to further explore what sort of downstream consequences could be predicted by 
these perception gaps between political parties. Specifically, we wanted to determine whether 
falsely believing the opposing political party holds more extreme views than they actually report 
was correlated with a participant’s liking of their opponent party, their willingness to engage 
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with a member of the opponent party (shaking their hand, having political discussions, etc.), and 
their belief that they could change their mind on their position. As in Study 1, participants also 
reported how willing they were to voice their opinions on the partisan issues. 
 Some may question whether people’s reports of their egregious attitudes, such as 
prejudice levels or intolerance of different viewpoints are actually as low as reported. It may be 
that people under-report their agreement especially for egregious issues, concerned about the 
ramifications of admitting to holding such attitudes (Furnham, 1986). Although we suspect the 
survey anonymity would reduce the likelihood of this issue, we sought to further address it by 
including a measure of social desirability (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012).  
Method 
Participants American participants from Mechanical Turk (N = 816) ages 18 and above 
were tested. Participants answered the same questions as Study 1 regarding political affiliation; 
26.7% supported the Republicans, 51.2% supported the Liberals, 14.2% supported the 
Libertarians, 3.8% supported the Green party, and 4% were classified as “other” (self-reporting 
that they were independent or anarchist). Participants also classified themselves as either more 
conservative (n = 227), more liberal (n = 501), or both equally (n = 88) in regards to social issues 
specifically. Again, as our hypotheses focus on partisan differences in perceptions, only 
participants who self-categorized as mostly liberal or mostly conservative (n = 728) were 
included in analyses; those who reported being both equally represented 11% of the data and 
were excluded. 
Unlike Study 1’s between-subjects design, Study 2 presented participants with all 
attitudes from four conditions (Issue [Liberal Conservative] x Type [Mild, Extreme]) in a within-
subjects design. We strove to collect a reasonably large sample size to have sufficient numbers of 
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liberals and conservatives, and to get a reasonably stable estimate of partisan prevalence of 
certain attitudes.  
Procedure 
False Polarization and Voicing Just as in Study 1, participants were presented with 
definitions for “Liberal” and “Conservative”, and asked to report their political affiliation by first 
selecting which party they support, and then classifying themselves as either more liberal, more 
conservative, or both equally in terms of social issues. Following this, participants completed the 
shortened Social Desirability scale.  
 Participants were then presented with a list of 16 partisan issues; these issues were 
selected by the researchers to be either liberal or conservative, and either mild or extreme (See 
Appendix B for complete list, and study materials). Participants first indicated their degree of 
personal agreement for each of the 16 issues. Next, as in Study 1, participants estimated the 
percentage of liberals and conservatives who at least somewhat agreed with each of the issues. 
Participants were then asked to rate the extremity of each issue on a scale from Very Mild (0) to 
Very Extreme (10), in order to determine whether our classifications matched the perceptions of 
the participants. After this, participants were presented with the complete list once more, and 
were asked to indicate how willing they would be to voice their opinion publicly on each one.  
Liking, Engagement, and Changed Minds Participants then answered questions 
regarding how much they like and/or dislike members of both their own and the opposing party, 
their willingness to engage with members of the opposing political party, and how likely both 
their own and the opposing political party would be to change their mind on the issues presented.  
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Media Participants were asked about their media consumption habits (specifically asking 
them how often they watch certain networks), as well as general demographic information 
(including age, gender, highest level of education, and annual household income). 
Materials All of the participants completed the survey online, which included the 
following measures: 
Social Desirability Scale Participants completed the shortened Social Desirability (SD) 
scale (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972) in order to determine whether some of their responses to the 
personal agreement questions were due to SD demands. The scale consisted of 12 self-reflective 
items (α = 72), and participants were asked to read them, and decide if each statement was 
“True” or “False”. For example, participants were presented with statements like “No matter 
who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.” 
Personal Agreement As in Study 1, participants were asked their degree of personal 
agreement with partisan issues. However, this time, participants answered on a scale from (1) 
Strongly Disagree, to (6) Strongly Agree, to eliminate the neutral midpoint. 
Other Agreement Again, as in Study 1, participants were asked to estimate the 
percentage of Liberals and Conservatives who agreed with the issues, on a sliding scale ranging 
from 0% to 100%.  
Extremity In order to determine whether our own categorization of issues as either mild 
or extreme was in line with how participants were perceiving them, we asked participants to rate 
the issues on a scale ranging from (0) Very Mild, to (10) Very Extreme. 
Voicing Opinion We asked participants about the likelihood of voicing their opinions. 
Specifically, we asked them how willing they would be to voice their opinions on the issues, on a 
scale ranging from (1) Completely Unwilling, to (6) Completely Willing.  
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Liking Participants were asked on a scale of (1) Not At All, to (5) Very Much how much 
they like Liberals and Conservatives. They were also asked to list what they like and dislike 
about members of both groups. 
Engagement Participants were asked to answer five questions regarding how willing they 
would be to engage with members of the opposing political party. Specifically, they were asked, 
on scale from (1) Extremely Unwilling, to (6) Extremely Willing, whether they would be willing 
to have a political discussion, go out on a date, shake hands, and share a taxi with members of 
the opposing political party. As well, they were asked how they would feel about their son or 
daughter getting engaged to a member of the opposing political party on a scale ranging from (1) 
Extremely Negatively, to (6) Extremely Positively. We aggregated these five items for analyses 
(α = .69).  
Changing Mind Participants were asked to think about the likelihood that they would 
change their mind on partisan issues (e.g. if they initially agreed, how likely would they be to 
disagree) after having a discussion with a member of the opposing political party. They rated 
their likelihood on a scale ranging from Not Likely At All (0%) to Entirely Likely (100%). As it 
was not part of the primary research question, this measure was exploratory, and not included in 
this thesis.  
Media Consumption Based on data from Study 1, we determined the most viewed 
television news stations were ABC News, MSNBC, CBS News, Fox News, and CNN (we also 
included “other”, with the opportunity to fill in one of their own). Participants were then asked to 
report how often they watched each of these news stations on a scale ranging from Never Watch 
(0 Minutes), to 6.5 Hours or More. Additionally, participants were asked to report whether the 
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news stations listed were liberal-leaning, centrist, or conservative-leaning. However, as was 
mentioned previously, analyses focused on MSNBC and Fox News. 
We then asked participants to list their own top three sources of print or online news, 
whether each of the three were liberal-leaning, centrist, or conservative-leaning, and for how 
many hours a day they spend consuming news from those sources (on the same scale as above).  
Finally, we asked participants to list their own top three social media sources or 
discussion boards where they either read about or engage in discussions about politics. They then 
answered the same questions regarding the sources’ political leaning, and how much time they 
spent consuming news from those sources. Again, these questions were for demographic 
purposes, and will not be discussed in this thesis.  
Results 
Social Desirability There was some concern regarding whether participants were 
responding in socially desirable ways when asked about their personal agreement with the more 
extreme items (this would not be a concern with the mild items, as it was not considered 
controversial to endorse them). Though we assumed that the anonymous nature of the survey 
would be enough to deter socially desirable responding, bivariate correlations were run to 
determine whether higher social desirability scores predicted less agreement with the extreme 
items. Social desirability scores were not correlated with reported personal agreement for either 
the mild, or the extreme liberal and conservative items (please see Table 8 for correlations).  
 This suggests that participants were not responding in socially desirable ways when asked 
about their personal agreement with these items.5  
                                                          
5 Additionally, we ran the key analyses a second time, where Social Desirability was used as a covariate wherever 
possible. This did not have a significant impact on any of the reported results. 
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Issue Extremity As one of the limitations of the previous study was the fact that only a 
single issue was selected for each mild and extreme partisan category (impeding generalization 
and making it possible that effects were due to a single issue), participants rated multiple issues 
and were asked to rate the extremity of each of the issues listed (see Table 9 for a full list of 
mean extremity ratings). In the majority of cases, participants’ extremity ratings lined up with 
our initial assumptions about which issues were more or less extreme. The item regarding safe 
spaces, initially created as a more extreme item, was actually interpreted as mild (as opposed to 
our intended extreme rating). In order to determine whether our extreme items were significantly 
more extreme than our mild items, we ran a paired-samples t-test comparing the lowest rated 
extreme item (excluding the safe spaces item) which was about affirmative action (M = 5.99, SD 
= 2.86), to the highest rated mild item, which was nationwide gun rights (M = 5.44, SD = 2.78). 
As these were significantly different from one another (t(712) = -3.96, p < .001, 95% CI [-.82, -
.28]), we regarded this as our cut-off for mild and extreme scores. As the Safe Spaces item was 
below our cut-off for extreme items, it was excluded from subsequent analyses.   
False Polarization In this study, for brevity, false polarization was only assessed using 
the percentage comparison approach used in Study 1 (see Table 10 for a complete list of 
agreement scores). These percentages were calculated by taking the average personal agreement 
percentages (the % of each partisan group who at least somewhat agree with each issue) and 
compared to participants’ average estimated percent agreement for each party.  
 Overall, the partisan issues that were correctly categorized as either mild or extreme 
(when compared to participants’ ratings) followed the same pattern as was seen in Study 1. On 
average, 91% of liberal participants agreed with the mild liberal issues (healthcare, 
environmental protection policies, etc.), and conservatives estimated that 82% of liberals at least 
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somewhat agreed (t(225) = -7.78,  p < .001, 95 % CI [-11.36, -6.77]). Rather than false 
polarization, results for mild issues reflected fairly high agreement and some mild (but 
significant) under-estimation. Similarly, 87% of conservatives agreed with the mild conservative 
issues (gun rights, limited government involvement in business, etc.), and liberals estimated that 
75% of conservatives agreed (t(500) = -14.03, p < .001, 95 % CI [-13.24, -9.99]).  
 For the extreme issues, these averaged scores were calculated excluding the Safe Spaces 
item, as it did not fall in line with participants’ extremity ratings. 
 On average, 23% of liberals agreed with the extreme liberal issues (restricting free 
speech, enforcing political correctness, etc.), while conservatives estimated that 62% of liberals 
agreed (t(225) = 23.94, p < .001, 95% CI [35.56, 41.94]). Similarly, 43% of conservatives agreed 
with the extreme conservative issues (de-funding the public schools, outlawing abortion, The 
Wall, etc.), while liberals estimated that 56% of conservatives agreed (t(500) = 17.57, p < .001, 
95% CI [14.53, 18.19]). Once again as predicted, people over-estimated prevalence of extreme 
attitudes, reflecting an aspect of false polarization.  
 It should be noted in this case that there was a surprising percentage of conservatives who 
agreed with the construction of The Wall (73.5%); this was significantly more than the other 
extreme conservative items, even though it was rated as an extreme item (Please see Table 11 for 
t-test comparisons).  
As in Study 1, there was also an over-estimation of own-party agreement with extreme 
issues. Again, these over-estimations were still significantly smaller than estimations made by 
opposing party members (See Tables 12 and 13 for means and t-test results).  
Liking Generally speaking, liking patterns showed a typical in-group/out-group pattern: 
Liberals (M = 3.94, SD = 0.84) liked other liberals more than they liked conservatives (M = 2.36, 
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SD = 0.91), t(481) = 25.68, p < .001, 95% CI [1.45, 1.67]. Similarly, conservatives (M = 4.03, 
SD = 0.76) liked other conservatives more than they liked liberals (M = 2.87, SD = 0.94), t(218) 
= -14.32, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.32, -1.00]. 
 We hypothesized that liking of the opposing political party would be correlated with the 
degree to which a participant thought the opponent side agreed with extreme issues. For both 
liberals and conservatives, we found this to be the case, such that liberals who believed that a 
greater proportion of conservatives held extreme views reported greater dislike for conservatives 
(r (486) = -.25, p < .001), and conservatives who believed that a greater proportion of liberals 
held extreme views reported greater dislike for liberals (r(226) = -.14, p = .03). 
 For conservative participants, liberal dislike was also correlated with estimated liberal 
percent agreement on mild liberal issues, r(226) = -.13, p = .04. This may suggest that liberals 
are particularly influenced by their misperceptions of conservatives, and that conservatives 
dislike liberals for both their correctly perceived and misperceived attitudes.  
Engagement Overall, the degree to which liberals liked conservatives was correlated 
with how willing they were to engage with them, such that greater liking predicted greater 
willingness to engage (r(486) = .39, p < .001). Similarly, for conservatives, greater liberal liking 
predicted greater willingness to engage (r(227) = .37, p < .001). Please see Table 14 for complete 
correlations with each scale item.  
 Further, for liberal participants, perceived conservative agreement with extreme 
conservative issues was negatively correlated with willingness to engage overall (r(501) = -.091, 
p = .042), but perceived agreement with mild conservative issues was not (See Table 15 for full 
correlations with individual engagement items). This was not the case for conservative 
participants; perceptions of liberal agreement, for either mild or extreme items, was unrelated to 
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willingness to engage overall (See Table 16 for full correlations with individual engagement 
items).  
Voicing We ran a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, with Type (mild or extreme) and 
Issue (Liberal or Conservative) as the within-subjects factors, and Affiliation (Liberal or 
Conservative) as the between-subjects factor, to determine whether these factors predicted the 
likelihood of participants voicing their opinions on the partisan issues.  
 We found a significant 3-way interaction between type, issue, and affiliation, F(1,717) = 
121.10, p < .001, η2 = .144 (Please see Table 17 for complete list of means). This interaction 
indicates that liberal participants (M = 4.37, SE = 0.05) are willing to speak up about the mild 
liberal issues more than conservative participants (M = 4.04, SE = 0.08) (p = .001). Similarly, 
conservative participants (M = 4.10, SE = 0.09) are more willing than liberal participants (M = 
3.83, SE = 0.06) to speak up about mild conservative issues (p = .010). As in Study 1, liberals (M 
= 3.58, SE = 0.07) were no more likely to speak up about the extreme liberal issues than 
conservatives (M = 3.58, SE = 0.10) (p = ns). However, liberals (M = 4.26, SE = 0.07) were far 
more likely to speak up about extreme conservative issues than conservatives (M = 3.60, SE = 
.010) (p < .001).  
Media Consumption A partial correlation was run to assess relationships between media 
consumption and perceptions of partisans. Political affiliation was used a covariate in the 
analyses.  
Overall, the more time a participant spent watching Fox News, the greater their perceived 
liberal agreement estimations for extreme liberal issues (r(702) = .170, p < .001). The more time 
a participant spent watching MSNBC, the greater their perceived conservative agreement 
estimations for extreme conservative issues (r(702) = .117, p = .002). Watching more MSNBC 
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or Fox News had no relationship with agreement estimates on mild conservative or liberal issues 
(please see Table 18 for correlations). For a full list of correlations between news station and 
each issue individually, please see Table 19. 
Study 2 Discussion 
 As in Study 1, we found that false polarization was present when participants were 
making estimations about the opposing political party members’ opinions on extreme issues, and 
not mild ones. Additionally, this only happened when participant ratings of extremity were 
congruent with our assumptions about which issues were mild and extreme. These findings 
extended the first study by including many more issues and empirically assessing which ones 
were deemed extreme to participants.  
 We created items that, based on our intuition, might be more mild or extreme, but relied 
on a manipulation check of severity to tell us whether our choices were correct. Most items we 
selected fell where expected in severity, with the exception of safe spaces. The other unexpected 
pattern emerged for “building the wall.”  Here, mean severity was high enough to place in the 
originally intended category, but subsequent analyses did indicate that severity was considerably 
lower for conservatives and higher for liberals. Because we did not plan to sort on that basis, we 
kept The Wall in the severe condition. However, whereas most of the severe items revealed 
fairly low support from partisans (in line with our view that they are egregious but rare), the Wall 
did not – a considerable majority of conservatives supported this issue. This item inflated the 
personal agreement scores for conservatives considerably. In retrospect, we determined that one 
reason for this divergence may be that we did not frame the Wall as overtly egregious – this 
could reflect our own bias (assuming it sounded egregious enough as it was), but it is possible it 
could be framed in a way that highlights the xenophobic attitudes underlying it. Further, we 
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speculate that unlike some other issues, the Wall may be viewed as pertaining to different values 
by liberals and conservatives – liberals may see it as a reflection of racism, and conservatives 
may see it as a reflection of law and order and job security (hence, the egregiousness of this topic 
may be more divided across party lines than some of the other egregious issues). Overall, this 
manipulation check also provided assurance that our conceptualization “extreme” was similar to 
how participants were conceptualizing the term. 
 This over-estimation of particularly extreme or egregious issues may have significant 
consequences. First, higher prevalence of over-estimation of the opponent party’s extreme 
attitudes predicted greater dislike of that party. Dislike was more strongly linked to extreme 
attitudes than mild ones; for instance liberals who thought conservatives agreed with issues like 
defunding the public school system, for example, disliked them more than if they believed 
conservatives agreed with reducing taxation. Further, the degree to which participants liked 
members of the opposing party then predicted how willing they would be to engage with them in 
activities ranging from having a political discussion, to sharing a taxi, to going on a romantic 
date (though their desire to engage in discussion is most relevant in the current political climate). 
Additionally, we found that, overall, participants were less willing to voice their opinions on the 
extreme issues congruent with their political affiliation than they were for the mild issues.  
These findings suggests that a) participants dislike opposing party members more when 
they perceive greater agreement with extreme issues (attitudes that not all of them share), b) that 
this then leads to a decrease in willingness to engage with them, and c) that even if they do 
engage in discussion, in particular, they are not likely to disprove their own party’s assumed 
agreement with extreme partisan issues, as they are less likely to voice their opinion on the 
subject. The finding that partisans are less likely to voice dissenting opinions when believing 
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their own party holds extreme opinions may be, in part, perpetuating the cycle of false 
polarization. If, as our findings suggest, partisans are not voicing their opinion on the extreme 
issues, opposing party members will have no way of knowing that their perceptions of agreement 
are erroneous (leading to dislike, and further reduction in willingness to discuss).  
Study 3 
 In Study 2, over-estimation of agreement with egregious issues predicted greater dislike 
of members of the opposing political party, as well as decreased willingness to engage with 
them. In Study 3, we wanted to determine if participants were consciously basing more of this 
dislike of the opposing political party on their perceived agreement with the extreme issues 
(issues we know they do not universally agree with). In other words, we were particularly 
interested in finding out whether a liberal is attributing their dislike of a conservative to their 
perceived agreement with more extreme and egregious attitudes (defunding the public school 
system, racial discrimination). This is meaningful, because if dislike is based on the perceived 
prevalence of these extreme attitudes, it also means people are basing their dislike on views that 
the opponent party holds to a far lesser degree than is assumed.  
 We do recognize that there tends to be, by-and-large, more agreement from conservatives 
on the extreme conservative issues than liberals (and vice-versa). One might argue, then, that it is 
legitimate to dislike the party on that basis. However, it is a minority that hold those views, 
which appears to be unrecognized by the opposing party (as is evident by their over-estimations). 
Just as one would caution against disliking all members of a stigmatized group (e.g., Muslims) 
because of the actions of a few extremists (e.g., Islamic terrorists), we suggest that the degree of 
dislike directed at the members of the opponent party is at least partly ill-founded if based on a 
misconception of extreme view prevalence.   
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 As in Study 1 and 2, participants were presented with the list of partisan issues in order to 
replicate our previous findings. Items examining Voicing and Media Consumption were not 
examined to keep the study brief, and focused on a single research question.  
Method 
Participants American participants from Mechanical Turk (N = 300) ages 18 and above 
were tested. Participants answered the same questions as in previous studies regarding political 
affiliation; 30.7% supported the Republicans, 49.7% supported the Liberals, 11% supported the 
Libertarians, 4% supported the Green party, and 4.3% were classified as “other” (self-reporting 
that they were independent or anarchist). Participants also classified themselves as either more 
conservative (n = 98), more liberal (n = 169), or both equally (n = 33) in regards to social issues 
specifically. Again, as our hypotheses focus on partisan differences in perceptions, only 
participants who self-categorized as mostly liberal or mostly conservative (n = 267) were 
included in analyses; those who reported being both equally represented 11% of the data and 
were excluded. 
Procedure Participants began with the definition of Liberal and Conservative, and were 
asked to provide their political affiliation. 
Participants were then provided with a list of 17 partisan issues; the list included the same 
items from the list used in Study 2, however, three items were changed. First, the Wall item 
(which we hypothesized that conservatives were interpreting as more to do with national 
security, rather than something potentially racist) was replaced with an item about DACA/ The 
Dreamer Program. Second, the abortion item was split into two separate items (one that was 
more moderate/ mild, and one that was more extreme); this was done because participants may 
have felt like the extreme item was the only way they could express their disagreement with 
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abortion, causing a falsely inflated response rate. Third, the Safe Spaces item was re-written to 
be more extreme (Please see Appendix C for complete list of items, and full study materials). As 
in previous studies, participants indicated their degree of personal agreement with each item, 
followed by their percentage estimates of Liberal and Conservative agreement.  
Finally, participants answered the Liking and Engagement questions from Study 2. 
Following this, participants rated the degree to which their “liking” of liberals and conservatives 
was based on each group’s stance on each of the 17 issues. 
In order to keep this study brief, and focused only on participants’ reasons for dislike 
opposing party members, no questions regarding media consumption or voicing opinions were 
asked.  
Materials All of the participants completed the survey online. The measurement of 
interest was as follows: 
The Personal Agreement, Other Agreement, and Engagement scales were the same ones 
used in Study 2. 
Motive for Liking Participants were asked “How much of your like or dislike for 
[liberals][conservatives] has to do with their position on the following issues? That is, if their 
position makes you like or dislike them more, then you would indicate a higher place on the 
scale”, followed by a list of 17 partisan issues. They then responded for each issue on a sliding 
scale ranging from (1) None, to (7) Very Much. Participants were first asked about liberals, then 
conservatives.   
Liking The “liking” scale was adjusted to range from (0) Not At All, to (100) Very 
Much; this was done so that more variance could be captured.   
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Results 
False Polarization False polarization was assessed using the percentage comparison 
approach that was used in studies 1 and 2. 
Overall, the false polarization findings followed the same pattern as was seen in Studies 1 
and 2. See Table 20 for a complete list of agreement scores. 
 On average, 91% of liberal participants agreed with the mild liberal issues, and 
conservatives estimated that 80% of liberals at least somewhat agreed (t(97) = -5.80,  p < .001, 
95 % CI [-14.72, -7.21]). Similarly, 76% of conservatives agreed with the mild conservatives 
issues, and liberals estimated that 73% of conservatives agreed (t(168) = -2.29, p = .023, 95 % CI 
[-6.26, -0.46]). Once again, findings reflected slight but significant under-estimation of the 
prevalence of mild attitudes, and considerable accuracy.  
 On average, 29% of liberals agreed with the extreme liberal issues, while conservatives 
estimated that 69% of liberals agreed (t(97) = 18.22, p < .001, 95% CI [35.24, 43.86]). Similarly, 
42% of conservatives agreed with the extreme conservative issues, while liberals estimated that 
58% of conservatives agreed (t(168) = 9.33, p < .001, 95% CI [12.59, 19.35]). 
 Again, participants made significant over-estimations regarding their own party’s 
agreement with extreme items compared to their personal agreement scores. These estimations 
were significantly smaller than the estimations made by the opposing party (please see Table 21 
and 22 for means and t-test results).  
Liking As in Study 2, liberals (M = 73.55, SD = 21.55) liked other liberals more than 
they liked conservatives (M = 25.88, SD = 21.07), t(166) = 18.73, p < .001, 95% CI [42.64, 
52.69]. Similarly, conservatives (M = 76.22, SD = 18.10) liked other conservatives more than 
they liked liberals (M = 25.64, SD = 23.09), t(95) = -13.89, p < .001, 95% CI [-57.81, -43.36]. 
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 For both liberals and conservatives, we found that higher prevalence estimates for 
extreme attitudes predicted greater dislike. Liberals estimates of extreme conservative views 
predicted disliking conservatives (r(167) = -.25, p = .001), and conservatives’ estimates of 
extreme liberal views predicted disliking liberals (r(97) = -.45, p < .001). 
 For liberal participants, conservative dislike was also correlated with estimated 
conservative agreement on mild conservative issues, r(167) = -.19, p = .01.   
 Additionally, we wanted to make sure that participants’ own personal agreement with the 
items was not having some kind of indirect effect on the relationship between perceived 
agreement with the items, and liking of the opposing political party. To assess this, we ran linear 
regressions that included both personal agreement, and estimation of opposing party agreement 
in the model. This allowed us to examine whether partisans like the opposite party more when a) 
they personally agree more with the opponents’ issues, or b) when they over-estimate the 
prevalence of the opponent group’s agreement.   
 For the mild items, the more a conservative personally agreed with mild liberal issues, the 
more they liked liberals (See Table 23 for full model). This was the case for liberals as well; the 
more they personally agreed with mild conservative issues, the more they liked conservatives 
(See Table 24 for full model). When personal attitude was entered, perceptions of opponent party 
no longer predicted liking.  For the extreme items, over-estimating opponents’ prevalence of 
agreement predicted dislike for both parties: the more conservatives believed liberals agree with 
the extreme liberal items, the less they like them (even controlling for their own personal 
agreement which became non-significant (See Table 25 for full model). Again, this was also the 
case for liberals, in that the more they believed conservatives agreed with the extreme 
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conservative items, the less they like them even when controlling for their own personal 
agreement, which in this case remained significant as well (See Table 26 for full model).   
 One surprising finding was that personal agreement predicted liking (over and above 
agreement estimations) with mild issues for both parties. It is possible that this is a variance 
issue; there is less variance in the mild conditions, as estimations of opponent prevalence are 
relatively high, so personal agreement scores may become better predictors of liking of opposing 
party members. It is also possible that because there is an underlying assumption that the 
majority of opposing party members agree with the mild issues, that personal agreement ratings 
(which did show variability, even for the opponent party) become more relevant to the 
participant in considering how much they like them. Further study here is needed.    
Motive for Liking Examining correlations is one way to assess the link between liking 
and prevalence estimates, however we cannot know if these relations are causal (it could be that 
dislike predicts prevalence estimates or that a third variable predicts both ratings). It also does 
not reveal whether people consciously link their dislike to certain issues.  
We assessed this latter question by asking directly what people base their dislike on. To 
determine whether participants were attributing more of their liking and disliking of members of 
the opposing political party to their perceived stance on mild and extreme issues, we ran a 2 
(Type [Mild or Extreme]) x 2 (Issue [liberal or conservative]) x 2 (Affiliation) repeated measures 
ANOVA, with the motive for disliking items as the within-subjects factors, and affiliation as the 
between-subjects factor. We found a significant 3-way interaction, F(1,263) = 146.52, p < .001, 
η2 = .34 (See Figure 1). Liberals attributed more of their dislike of conservatives on their 
perceived stance on extreme conservative issues (M = 4.62, SE = 0.13) compared to mild ones 
(M = 4.23, SE = 0.12) (p = .001), while conservatives attributed more of their dislike of liberals 
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on their perceived stance on extreme liberal issues (M = 4.65, SE = 0.17) compared to mild ones 
(M = 3.97, SE = 0.16) (p = .001). 
 We know from the “liking” analysis that perception of agreement for extreme items 
predicts greater dislike of members of the opposing political party. We ran a bivariate correlation 
between liberal and conservative liking and attribution of dislike to the mild and extreme items; 
we split the file between liberals and conservatives so that we were only looking at liking for 
opposing party members. Here, we found that liberal and conservative liking of members of the 
opposing political party predicts greater attribution of dislike to agreement with extreme items, 
and not mild ones (see Table 27 for complete correlations).    
Engagement Again, overall, the degree to which liberals liked conservatives was 
correlated with how willing they were to engage with them, such that greater liking predicted 
greater willingness to engage (r(167) = .40, p < .001). Similarly, for conservatives, greater liberal 
liking predicted greater willingness to engage (r(97) = .31, p < .001). Please see Table 28 for 
complete correlations with each scale item. 
As in Study 2, for liberal participants, perceived conservative agreement with extreme 
conservative issues was negatively correlated with willingness to engage overall (r(169) = -.173, 
p = .024), but perceived agreement with mild conservative issues was not (See Table 29 for full 
correlations with individual engagement items). Again, this was not the case for conservative 
participants; perceptions of liberal agreement, for either mild or extreme items, was unrelated to 
willingness to engage overall (See Table 30 for full correlations with individual engagement 
items). 
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Study 3 Discussion 
 Again, false polarization findings were replicated; participants consistently over-
estimated the degree to which the opposing political party members held egregious attitudes. 
This over-estimation was not present when looking at mild issues.  
 As well, just as in Study 2, participants who believed opposing party members agreed 
with extreme issues reported disliking them more, and that this dislike was predictive of a 
unwillingness to engage with them. Additionally, we found that participants attributed more of 
their dislike of the opposing party members to their perceived stance on the extreme issues, a 
stance we know that many partisans do not actually hold. 
 This suggests that participants, who are aware of the reasons for their dislike of their 
opponents, are actually grounding this dislike in a falsehood, an illusory attitude that does not 
exist. They are then less likely to discuss, shake hands, or even share a taxi with their opponents, 
thereby denying their opponents the opportunity to share their true opinions and dispel the myth.  
General Discussion 
 The polarization of political parties in the United States has the potential to disrupt the 
democratic process; neither side will be willing to compromise on important social and economic 
issues if they perceive an ever-widening divide between one another. False polarization, the 
perception of a gap between individuals or groups with opposing views (a gap which does not 
reflect reality) may be a contributing factor, and warrants additional study.  
Across the three studies presented in this thesis, false polarization findings were 
consistent: Partisans assumed more of their opponents held the most extreme and egregious 
views that their party espoused. When participants were asked about the opposing party’s 
endorsement of mild items (like tax reduction and healthcare), they were relatively accurate at 
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estimating what percentage of the opposing party would agree. For instance, participants knew 
that most liberals would endorse universal healthcare, and most liberals indeed reported feeling 
this way. In fact, there was a slight under-estimation, in that participants estimated that fewer 
opposing party members agreed with those mild items than actually reported agreeing. This mild 
underestimation, then, does not reflect false polarization. In contrast, false polarization emerged 
when comparing opposing party agreement estimates and personal agreement scores for the 
extreme items only. When participants were asked about the opposing party’s endorsement of 
extreme items (like discrimination or restricting free speech), they consistently over-estimated 
the percentage of the opposing party who agreed (when compared to their personal reported 
agreement). For example, liberal participants consistently believed that around half of 
conservatives believed in actively discriminating against Latin American and Muslim 
immigrants, but less than a quarter of them actually reported feeling this way. Additionally, this 
gap between perceived agreement and reported agreement could not be accounted for by socially 
desirable responding; social desirability did not predict personal agreement. These findings 
suggest that the image that partisans have of opposing party members may, in fact, be partially 
based on an illusion. This means, essentially, that partisans are (at least some of the time) 
judging the opposing party members on opinions and attitudes they do not actually hold (or at 
least not to the extent believed). If a liberal’s conceptualization of a conservative is based on 
their (incorrect) assumption that they would endorse egregious attitudes (like completely 
defunding the public school system), then any downstream consequences that follow are also 
based on an incorrect assumption. 
 This was demonstrated in studies 2 and 3. These studies suggested that false polarization 
may underlie serious intergroup consequences. In Study 2, believing that a larger percentage of 
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the opposing political party members endorsed extreme items correlated strongly with inter-party 
dislike, and this dislike was correlated with an unwillingness to engage. In other words, a 
conservative who believes that the majority of liberals agree with extreme liberal issues is likely 
to also report disliking liberals, and will be less willing to have a conversation, share a taxi, 
shake their hand, etc. This suggests that at least part of the rise in hostility between partisans may 
be because of false polarization.  
 Further, in Study 3, we demonstrated that the reason that participants disliked opposing 
party members was at least partially because of their perceived agreement with the extreme 
items. Liberals reported that much more of their dislike for conservatives was based on their 
perceived stance on extreme conservative issues, as opposed to mild ones. In other words, 
partisans reported basing their dislike on attitudes that a majority of the opponent group did not 
even hold. Regressions also demonstrated that this relationship between perceived agreement 
with extreme items and dislike was still strong even when controlling for the participant’s own 
personal agreement with those items.  
 Additionally, in studies 1 and 2, we demonstrated that partisans were less likely to voice 
their opinion (which would often be dissent) on the extreme own-party issues. For example, 
liberals reported that they would remain silent when the conversation was about free speech, and 
similarly, conservatives would be quiet when the discussion centered on racism and 
discrimination. It’s possible that this, too, is contributing to false polarization, in that members of 
the opposing political party (who partisans believe have egregious opinions) are not willing to 
voice their true opinion on those topics, which is that they largely disagree. This may be because 
partisans tended to believe that more of their own party agreed with those extreme items than 
actually report doing so (however, these estimations are still smaller than the estimations made 
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by the opposing side). Further study would be needed to clarify the root cause of this belief; 
regardless, if partisans over-estimate their own party’s adherence to egregious views, they may 
not voice their own dissent for fear of being rejected by their party.  
 These studies also attempted to provide some explanation as to why false polarization 
might be occurring. We speculated that exposure to partisan media would lead participants to 
believe that opposing party members held more extreme attitudes than they actually did, and this 
speculation was supported by preliminary evidence. Participants who reported watching more 
Fox News were more likely to believe that liberals endorsed the extreme liberal attitudes, while 
participants who watched more MSNBC were more likely to believe that conservatives endorsed 
extreme conservative attitudes (even when controlling for participants’ own political 
orientation). This is consistent with past findings that exposure to opinionated news sources can 
sway the viewer’s own opinion in the direction that was presented to them (Feldman, 2011). This 
suggests that if a participant finds themselves in a news bubble, they’re likely to be exposed to 
vivid portrayals of partisans, with no counter examples (like, for example, the many stories of 
liberals attempting to ban free speech on college campuses, with no reports of open-minded 
liberals), they’re more likely to begin to hold the resulting perception of liberals, just like the 
ones they saw on the news. This makes these illustrative examples more cognitively available. 
Further, previous work has shown that partisans have stronger directional goals than accuracy 
ones, meaning that they are motivated to seek out and process information that is consistent with 
their pre-existing beliefs, regardless of whether this information is accurate (Lord, Ross & 
Lepper, 1979; Meirick, 2012; Stroud, 2011). This suggests that partisans who watched these 
news stations might have held on to these unflattering examples of opposing party members (as 
they were consistent with preconceived notions on what a liberal or conservative looks like), and 
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that these vivid examples become overgeneralized and inform their perceptions on the 
prevalence of extreme opinions.   
 All together, these findings paint an interesting and complex picture of the process a 
partisan is potentially going through when considering what kind of people make up the 
opposing political party. Let’s say that Derrick the Democrat, after tuning into MSNBC, is about 
to go to a party where he knows people with conservative perspectives will be in attendance. 
Because of the exposure to partisan media, he already has some idea of what these conservative 
individuals will be like, what attitudes they’ll have, and what opinions they’ll hold, especially 
since the latest piece aired was on an apparent upsurge of hate-crimes since Trump’s election. 
Once at the party, Derrick reflects on what he “knows” about conservatives before deciding on 
interacting with any; he remembers the hate-crime piece, and assumes that many conservatives 
are likely to support bigoted actions including hate crimes. He becomes filled with intense 
dislike, and decides that for the rest of the evening, he will not bother to introduce himself to (let 
alone discuss political topics with) any of the conservatives in attendance. Derrick has, in effect, 
denied himself the opportunity to correct his own assumptions about conservatives by talking to 
one, and discovering that they are, in all likelihood, not a racist bigot.  
Similarly, Rebecca the Republican is also at this party. She, after watching a piece on the 
dissolution of free-speech protection on college campuses on Fox News, has similarly negative 
views of most liberal intolerant snowflakes. She, too, is determined not to introduce herself to, or 
even shake hands with anyone who identifies as a liberal at this party, as she has decided she 
dislikes the majority of them. Again, her assumption will never be corrected due to her own self-
segregation from members of the opposing political party.  
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Finally, neither Derrick nor Rebecca will be likely to speak up and vocally dissent when 
conversations turn to the supposed extreme stances of their own political parties, thereby 
indirectly perpetuating the idea that the majority of liberals are fine with free speech restriction, 
and that the majority of conservatives are nonchalant about discrimination against immigrants. 
Rebecca is never exposed to Derrick’s disagreement, and vice-versa, so both individuals will 
leave the party with their image of the “typical” liberal and conservative intact. Since their social 
circles are made up of like-minded people, the chance of spontaneous exposure to incongruent 
information about opposing party members is relatively low.  
This may be a simplified illustration of how our findings may play out in vivo, but our 
belief is that each piece of the process plays a significant role in the initial formation, and the 
perpetuation of these incorrect attitudes regarding members of the opposing side. 
Issues of interpretation. One important aspect to note is that, generally, people are 
relatively accurate in their predictions about what kinds of issues liberals and conservatives agree 
with. For instance, when tracking how personal agreement and perceived agreement correlate 
across the issues, liberals seem to have a good idea when conservatives will agree with 
something more than they do, and vice-versa; the trend-lines follow similar paths. Based on our 
current study design, it would be difficult to tease apart the degree to which downstream 
consequences are influenced by either the accuracy of perceived agreement, or the inaccuracy in 
prevalence estimates. For instance, the average conservative seems to know that liberals DO 
agree with restricting freedom of speech more than other conservatives (though the overall 
percentages are small), and this knowledge of the slight mean difference may be driving their 
dislike of liberals (rather than the large over-estimate of prevalence). We suspect that the 
important component here is not the relative accuracy (that one group tends to score higher than 
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the other on average), but the idea that partisans are assuming the majority of the opposing party 
members are endorsing extreme opinions. Given that in many cases opponents agreed with one 
another more than they disagreed on extreme issues (in many cases a mean party difference 
reflected a difference between ‘strongly” and “somewhat” disagree, rather than between “agree” 
and “disagree”), we suggest that it is the overestimate of agreement prevalence that is driving at 
least some of the dislike and unwillingness to engage. However, we recognize the need for 
further testing in order to determine what kind of role this accuracy in tracking plays in dislike, 
as well as in polarization more generally.   
Additionally, it is important to address the proportion of liberals and conservatives who 
did actually report agreeing with the extreme items. We do not want to suggest that the low 
percentages of agreement mean that egregious views are irrelevant. In fact, many would argue 
that 5%, 10%, or 20% of people even “somewhat agreeing” with racism or censorship is still too 
much. It is conceivable that the conclusions of this research come across as dismissive of this 
issue. We do not aim to dismiss these concerns at all, however we suggest that over-estimation 
may perpetuate the problem further by increasing dislike, disengagement, and unwillingness to 
voice dissent. Engaging with opponents and (perhaps especially) with in-group dissenters may be 
key routes to encouraging extreme partisans to moderate their views. For this reason we suggest 
it is important to emphasize the relatively low prevalence of these beliefs, to counter the effects 
of pluralistic ignorance. 
It is also possible that some of our over-estimation scores may simply be a statistical 
artifact produced by the low number of participants who actually agree with extreme views. If 
(hypothetically) only 5% of people are doing something, it could be that there is no room for 
error except in the direction of over-estimation of the prevalence of that behaviour (since it’s 
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already so rare). This could produce some of the over-estimation, especially since some over-
estimates were also observed for the in-group. It is less clear that this artifact could produce the 
considerably larger over-estimate for the out-group. It is conceivable that in the absence of 
information to the contrary, people simply estimated around the midpoint (~50%) for an 
unknown out-group and lower for their (more familiar) in-group. However, the relation between 
media consumption and over-estimate is at least one piece of evidence against an artifactual 
account. Further research (perhaps examining both positive and negative extreme events) should 
further attempt to tease apart alternative explanations for the extremity findings.    
Limitations There were some basic limitations across all three studies due to our 
participant sample and our recruitment method. All of the participants were American, so there is 
some question as to whether these findings are generalizable to other nations as well. Studies 
were also conducted at a time of particularly high polarization for the US content, coinciding 
with the Trump presidency. Additionally, the issues themselves were selected specifically 
because of their relevance in the United States, so it is difficult to say whether “extreme” or 
“mild” issues in other countries would yield similar results, particularly if media does not play as 
large a role in public political discourse.  
The samples in each study were recruited exclusively from MTurk. Based on our own 
demographic information, the majority of participants from MTurk had a tendency to lean 
liberal, which suggests that our samples may not be a representative sample of all of the US. It is 
also the case that our participants were making estimations for liberal and conservative 
Americans, not necessarily liberal and conservative MTurkers (which we then compared to their 
personal agreement scores); it may be that this is an unfair comparison, especially because we 
are then making generalizations for all Americans. In future studies, we will aim to get the most 
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representative sample possible, such as paying for participant pools from a survey site like 
Qualtrics with equal numbers of conservatives and liberals (falling more objectively on either 
side of the political spectrum). Additionally, past research has found that liberal and conservative 
MTurkers are almost identical to liberal and conservative Americans, and are thus a reasonably 
valid sample to be used in research on political ideologies (Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015).   
Finally, all three studies were conducted online, which may affect the quality of 
responses. However, we suspect that the online format of the surveys actually enhanced 
willingness to privately report their views without the pressures of social desirability.  
 We tried, with each successive study, to cover or address the shortcomings of the 
previous one, but there are certain limitations that could not be addressed within the scope of this 
package. One such limitation is that the methods used in the current studies do not allow us to 
address the debate regarding the symmetry or asymmetry of effects across political parties. Some 
have argued that there is more propensity for conservatives to be biased because of their 
psychological features (cognitive rigidity, need for order, tolerance of uncertainty, etc.) (Jost, 
2017). Others argue that bias is basically equal between liberals and conservatives, and may just 
emerge in different domains (Ditto et al., 2017). Further, some argue that there is asymmetry at 
the level of political elites and media (Brock & Rabin-Havt, 2012; Hacker & Pierson, 2017) – 
that Republicans have strategically pushed toward extremes and forced the exacerbation of 
polarization. We do not currently have data to speak to these issues. However, is it notable that 
one of the interesting asymmetries built into our own study design was the nature of the extreme 
items themselves; the extreme liberal items (safe-spaces, free-speech, etc.) rarely make it into 
policy, whereas many of the extreme conservative items (defunding the public school system, 
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DACA, discrimination against immigrants, etc.) are issues that have been introduced into 
Republican policy in the past or currently.  
 Additionally, it is worth emphasizing that this research was conducted with Americans, 
and some of the causes and consequences could be particularly relevant to American politics. 
Different political systems (such as the Canadian parliamentary system) maybe less vulnerable to 
the effects of polarization. However, we suspect that some of the interpersonal and intergroup 
consequences of polarization are likely to generalize to countries other than the US.  
In the current package, the degree of false polarization (how wide the gap was between 
personal agreement and perceived agreement) between liberals and conservatives was not 
compared. It may be the case that one party is more susceptible to false polarization than the 
other. This would be something to address in future studies. This kind of comparison is difficult 
to do directly, as they hold different issues as central to their ideology, and we cannot be sure 
that those central issues can be compared fairly (are they equal in extremity, for example). This 
is actually an issue more generally, as the extremity ratings were not all the same within the mild 
and extreme categories. Here, we decided to sacrifice control (e.g., by using more comparable 
issues across conditions or parties) for ecological validity (using issues highly relevant to current 
political discourse). In doing this, the studies are more realistic, and pertain to daily American 
life.  
 A second possible limitation is specifically the way that we have classified who is 
considered liberal and conservative. We provided participants with a description of both political 
parties, in order to ensure everyone was working off of the same definition. However, this 
doesn’t necessarily mean everyone has the same conception of who the typical liberal or 
conservative is, and whether that conceptualization is who they have in mind when answering 
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the perceived agreement questions. The definitions we provided participants described liberal 
and conservative in terms of which political parties they would be likely to vote for (either 
Democrat or Republican), but did not go into detail regarding possible personality traits, typical 
opinions held by either party, etc. This was intentional; we did not want participants to be biased 
to our own idea of what constitutes the typical liberal or conservative. However, this may mean 
that we’re inadvertently comparing apples and oranges when comparing perceived agreement 
scores (where a participants will have their own image of a typical party member) and actual 
agreement (where the real party member is responding). This would be especially pertinent if 
people tend to envision an extreme stereotype as the typical partisan. Bringing to mind the 
extreme may bias people’s extremity ratings for the other party’s views. It is less clear whether 
bringing to mind a stereotyped extreme should account for prevalence estimates – this would 
suggest that they believe the opponent party is made up of a majority of stereotype consistent 
individuals.  
 One finding that was not addressed in the main results section, but is still of note, is that 
participants over-estimated their own group’s agreement with the extreme items. While this 
over-estimation was smaller than the estimations made by the opposing political party members, 
it still has a distinct consequence: pluralistic ignorance. Pluralistic ignorance is the idea that 
individuals in a group may each privately reject a norm or an attitude, but believe that most 
others in the group accepts it, as evidenced by their behaviour (Lambert, Kahn, & Apple, 2003; 
Prentice & Miller, 1996). In this case, individuals are reporting disagreement with the extreme 
items (private rejection), but estimate that a larger proportion of other in-group members agree 
than themselves. As mentioned previously, these in-group members are unlikely to voice their 
dissenting opinions on those extreme topics, and so their silence may be being misconstrued by 
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their fellow in-group members as acceptance of these egregious ideas. While this effect has been 
observed, this package does not address any potential consequences pluralistic ignorance may 
have on a party member’s attitude or opinion towards their own party.  
This over-estimation of own-party beliefs warrants further comment. Why would an 
individual make the same kind of over-estimation of their own party’s opinion on extreme issues, 
as they do with the opposing party’s opinion? It’s possible, as mentioned previously, that it is 
because of individual exposure to stereotypical portrayals of members of their in-group. For 
example, even though liberals may not be avidly watching news stations that portray them as 
overly-sensitive snowflakes, this does not mean they are completely unaware of the fact that 
they’re being portrayed that way. It is also possible that because of their affiliation, both in-
person and online, with members of their own party (something we know is happening based on 
our data), they may actually be encountering the few partisans who do hold extreme attitudes 
(they may also be among the most vocal about their views), and are generalizing those opinions 
to the rest of the party; these could be the people they have in mind when making their 
estimations of own-party agreement. While these are plausible explanations, more research is 
needed to clarify the cause. Additionally, even though this over-estimation exists, over-
estimations made by the opposing party were still greater.  
Finally, there is a “moving target” problem with the issues we chose to present to 
participants. As was mentioned in an earlier footnote, some issues like gun control, due to recent 
events (well after data collection had occurred) have made it difficult to conceptualize some 
issues as mild, especially with these issues carrying a strong moral component (equating lack of 
gun restrictions with the aiding and abetting of school shootings, as an example). While this does 
make exact replication of our studies difficult, we felt that the appeal to external validity was 
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worth this lack of control over our variables. This does, however, point to a related issue; 
political elites may be handling these topics differently than the American public. For example, 
while the average American (particularly conservatives) may not completely agree with the 
racial discrimination of immigrants, the recent move for the US Government to separate 
immigrant children from their parents has arguably cast the conservative elites in a racist light. 
This might, for some partisan perceivers, raise the question: “If the party you support is behaving 
in racist ways, does supporting them also make you a racist?” This question is, perhaps, beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but is an important aspect to consider when interpreting how our 
perception of conservative agreement with discrimination variable correlates with dislike and 
unwillingness to engage.  
Future Directions Beyond the previously discussed facets that require further 
investigation, there are three main areas in this line of research that would benefit most from 
additional exploration.  
 The first is what other possible causes there are for why individuals may have these false 
impressions of members of the opposing political party (that then feed the cycle of false 
polarization). In this package we have examined media’s potential role (specifically, television 
news), but there are certainly other sources fueling the illusion. For example, prominent political 
leaders are renowned for influencing their fellow party members; Trump, as an example, has 
done an effective job at continuously describing Democrats in increasingly outrageous ways, 
from wanting to “abolish all police” (Embury-Dennis, 2018), to being outright “Un-American” 
and “Treasonous” (Pramuk, 2018). For loyal Republicans, hearing this kind of messaging from 
the leader of their party may colour their image of Democrats in negative (and untrue) ways. At 
the same time, these prominent politicians sometimes enact the extreme behaviour that informs 
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false polarization – if a leader is a prototype of a party member, then extreme leaders would 
prompt more false polarisation. 
 Another interesting but unexplored possible cause for these false impressions is the rise 
in social media usage, and the insulated opinion bubbles that the algorithms have formed for 
their users. There has been much speculation about whether the formation of these “filter 
bubbles” exacerbates ideological polarization (Spohr, 2017), as well as whether it played a role 
in the 2016 election (El-Bermawy, 2017), but this connection between selective social media 
exposure and polarization has yet to be examined experimentally.  
 Secondly, it would be of interest to determine whether there are other downstream 
consequences to false polarization, particularly if these consequences have practical implications. 
For instance, does having an illusory image of the typical liberal or conservative then affect what 
kinds of policies partisans would agree with supporting, especially if the policy came from a 
Republican or a Democratic member of congress? It may be that believing opponents to be 
extreme leads partisans to double down on their own party’s more extreme views in response. 
Past literature has found that partisans in polarized environments (where political elites are 
highly polarized) rely on party endorsements of opinions more than substantive evidence when 
making policy-related decisions (Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013). This would suggest 
that polarization can indeed have a direct impact on the kinds of policies that are implemented, 
as well as the number of laws passed (Cloninger, Leibo, & Amjad, 2017).  
 Additionally, while we examined partisans’ willingness to engage with one another, we 
did not ask participants about their willingness to compromise with opposing party members, nor 
did we ask about their willingness to engage in conflict resolution. For example, it would be 
interesting to see if, when presented with a policy where compromise would be beneficial to both 
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parties (both Democrats and Republicans), individuals would engage in compromise with 
someone who was explicitly a member of the opposing party. There is some research that 
suggests that those who identify strongly with their party prefer political leaders who stand firm 
on principles instead of compromising (Wolf, Strachan, & Shea, 2012), but the factors that 
motivate partisans to compromise with opposing party members (or accept compromise from 
their leaders) has not been explored as deeply. Since compromise is a key element of a well-
functioning democracy, this particular line of research has important political implications.  
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, future studies should focus on attempting to 
mitigate the negative consequences following false polarization. In our other studies (not 
discussed in this paper), attempts were made to “debias” participants by providing them with 
correct information regarding the prevalence of the extreme attitudes (and pointing out that their 
own estimations were incorrect), with the hopes that this would decrease their dislike, and 
increase their willingness to engage. In the first iteration, participants reported not believing us 
regarding the actual attitudes of the opposing party members for extreme items, and thus our key 
dependent variables remained unaffected. In the second iteration, even after emphasizing that 
ethically, we are not allowed to provide them with false information, the dependent variables 
were unmoved (though participants did report believing us). This would suggest that even when 
provided with correct information, participants are unwilling to quickly incorporate it into their 
schemas of opposing party members, since it was incongruent with their previous beliefs. Future 
studies may need to provide more vivid examples of opponents who do not hold extreme views, 
or might attempt to debias in an alternate way such as appealing to emotion.  
 The present thesis highlights the impact of false polarization on attitudes towards 
opposing party members, attitudes that can then disrupt an individual’s desire to build 
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relationships with, or even engage with, those with whom they may disagree. In order to resolve 
conflict effectively, and to negotiate and reach fair compromises, these false and exaggerated 
differences (often perpetuated by partisan media) should be dispelled. Identifying when false 
polarization is more likely to happen (when asked to estimate opposing party member agreement 
on extreme issues compared to mild ones, for example) is a small but significant step towards 
achieving this goal.  
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Table 1:  
Exploratory Measures (Study 1) 
 
    
95% Confidence 
Interval 
  
Scale 
Political 
Affiliation 
Mean Std. Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
F p 
Intellectual 
Humility 
Liberal 3.634 .020 3.596 3.672 
27.331 <.001 
Conservative 3.464 .026 3.412 3.515 
Collective 
Narcissism 
Liberal 3.034 .038 2.961 3.108 
13.565 <.001 
Conservative 3.265 .050 3.167 3.364 
Social 
Vigilantism 
Liberal 5.061 .045 4.973 5.149 
2.087 .149 
Conservative 4.953 .060 4.835 5.070 
Modern 
Racism 
Liberal 2.147 .053 2.043 2.252 
441.441 <.001 
Conservative 4.014 .071 3.875 4.154 
NPI 
Liberal 1.81 .007 1.80 1.83 
4.585 .032 
Conservative 1.79 .009 1.77 1.81 
Note: For NPI, lower scores indicate greater narcissism.  
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Table 2: 
Complete Percentage Scores for Personal Agreement, Estimated Liberal Agreement, and 
Estimated Conservative Agreement with Partisan Issues (Study 1) 
 
 
 
% of 
Liberals: 
Personal  
Agreeme
nt 
% of 
Cons: 
Personal 
Agreement 
Liberal % 
Agree 
Estimate 
by 
Conservati
ves 
Liberal 
% Agree 
Estimate 
by 
Liberals 
Conservative 
% Agree 
Estimate by 
Liberals 
Conservative 
% Agree 
Estimate by 
Conservatives 
Mild 
Issues 
Healthcare 95% 54% 80% 80% 32% 46% 
Signing 
Healthcare 
Petitions 
88% 48% 75% 79% 31% 41% 
Gun Rights 52% 92% 35% 48% 77% 81% 
Protesting 
Gun Control 
44% 66% 41% 52% 60% 62% 
Extreme 
Issues 
Banning 
Speakers 
34% 15% 63% 50% 35% 27% 
Violently 
Protesting 
17% 8% 55% 28% 26% 19% 
Racism 
Against 
Immigrants 
4% 22% 25% 19% 57% 34% 
Discrimination 5% 13% 20% 13% 46% 27% 
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Table 3:  
Attitude Agreement Means By Condition and Political Affiliation (Study 1) 
 
Condition 
Political 
Affiliation 
Agreement Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
     
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Mild Liberal More cons. Personal 4.290 .162 3.972 4.609 
  Est. Liberal 5.806 .154 5.504 6.109 
  Est. Cons. 3.688 .163 3.368 4.008 
 More liberal Personal 6.389 .123 6.147 6.630 
  Est. Liberal 6.080 .117 5.851 6.309 
  Est. Cons. 2.623 .124 2.381 2.866 
Mild Cons. More cons. Personal 5.939 .157 5.631 6.248 
  Est. Liberal 2.869 .149 2.576 3.162 
  Est. Cons. 6.111 .158 5.801 6.421 
 More liberal Personal 4.331 .119 4.097 4.566 
  Est. Liberal 3.738 .113 3.516 3.961 
  Est. Cons. 5.820 .120 5.585 6.055 
Extreme 
Liberal 
More cons. Personal 2.330 .164 2.007 2.652 
  Est. Liberal 4.934 .156 4.629 5.240 
  Est. Cons. 2.462 .165 2.138 2.785 
 More liberal Personal 3.527 .120 3.290 3.763 
  Est. Liberal 4.036 .114 3.811 4.260 
  Est. Cons. 3.018 .121 2.780 3.255 
Extreme 
Cons. 
More cons. Personal 2.989 .167 2.661 3.316 
  Est. Liberal 2.648 .158 2.337 2.958 
  Est. Cons. 3.330 .168 3.001 3.658 
 More liberal Personal 1.329 .119 1.096 1.563 
  Est. Liberal 1.867 .113 1.645 2.089 
  Est. Cons. 4.763 .120 4.528 4.998 
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Table 4:  
Action Agreement Means By Condition and Political Affiliation (Study 1) 
     
Condition 
Political 
Affiliation 
Agreement Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
     
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Mild Liberal More cons. Personal 4.330 .162 4.011 4.649 
  Est. Liberal 5.577 .162 5.260 5.895 
  Est. Cons. 3.536 .172 3.199 3.873 
 More liberal Personal 5.994 .127 5.744 6.244 
  Est. Liberal 6.019 .127 5.770 6.268 
  Est. Cons. 2.766 .135 2.502 3.030 
Mild Cons. More cons. Personal 4.854 .163 4.534 5.175 
  Est. Liberal 3.698 .163 3.379 4.017 
  Est. Cons. 4.823 .173 4.484 5.162 
 More liberal Personal 4.077 .123 3.835 4.318 
  Est. Liberal 4.225 .123 3.984 4.465 
  Est. Cons. 4.734 .130 4.478 4.989 
Extreme 
Liberal 
More cons. Personal 
1.835 .168 1.506 2.164 
  Est. Liberal 4.604 .167 4.277 4.932 
  Est. Cons. 2.011 .177 1.663 2.359 
 More liberal Personal 2.418 .125 2.174 2.663 
  Est. Liberal 2.812 .124 2.569 3.055 
  Est. Cons. 2.836 .132 2.578 3.095 
Extreme 
Cons. 
More cons. Personal 
2.378 .169 2.047 2.709 
  Est. Liberal 2.322 .168 1.993 2.652 
  Est. Cons. 2.767 .178 2.417 3.117 
 More liberal Personal 1.339 .121 1.101 1.577 
  Est. Liberal 1.661 .121 1.424 1.898 
  Est. Cons. 4.397 .128 4.145 4.648 
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Table 5: 
Proportion of Liberals and Conservatives in Online and In-Person Social Circles (Study 1) 
 Liberal Participants Conservative Participants 
 Online In-Person Online In-Person 
Liberal 66.9% 67.4% 37.5% 36.2% 
Conservative 29.8% 30.2% 59.2% 62.5% 
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Table 6: 
Degree of Over-estimation between Personal Agreement and In-group Estimation, and between 
In-group and Out-group Estimation for Extreme Liberal Issues (Study 1) 
 
 Liberal Agreement 
Estimates by 
Liberals 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
Extreme Liberal 
Attitude, Personal 
Agreement (34%) 
49.74 23.76 8.71 172 <.001 12.17 19.31 
Extreme Liberal 
Action, Personal 
Agreement (17%) 
27.55 24.14 5.75 172 <.001 6.93 14.18 
 
 
Liberal Agreement 
Estimates by 
Conservatives 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
Extreme Liberal 
Attitude, Liberal 
Estimates 
(49.74%) 
62.71 28.15 4.46 93 <.001 7.21 18.74 
Extreme Liberal 
Action, Liberal 
Estimates 
(27.55%) 
54.95 27.95 9.50 93 <.001 21.66 33.11 
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Table 7: 
Degree of Over-estimation between Personal Agreement and In-group Estimation, and between 
In-group and Out-group Estimation for Extreme Conservative Issues (Study 1) 
 
 
Conservative 
Agreement 
Estimates by 
Conservatives 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 M SD t df p Lower Upper 
Extreme Con 
Attitude, Personal 
Agreement (22%) 
33.84 23.36 4.81 89 <.001 6.95 16.74 
Extreme Con 
Action, Personal 
Agreement (13%) 
27.30 24.92 5.44 89 <.001 9.08 19.52 
 
 
Conservative 
Agreement 
Estimates by 
Liberals 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
Extreme Con 
Attitude, Con 
Estimates 
(33.84%) 
57.00 23.10 13.30 174 <.001 19.73 26.60 
Extreme Con 
Action, Con 
Estimates 
(27.30%) 
46.34 25.63 11.89 174 <.001 19.21 26.86 
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Table 8:  
Social Desirability Correlations (Study 2) 
 
  
Personal 
Agreement with 
Mild Liberal 
Issues 
Personal 
Agreement with 
Extreme Liberal 
Issues 
Personal 
Agreement with 
Mild 
Conservative 
Issues 
Personal 
Agreement with 
Extreme 
Conservative 
Issues 
Social Desirability Scores 
r -.033 -.042 -.057 -.020 
p .368 .261 .124 .588 
N 727 724 727 727 
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Table 9: 
Participant Ratings of Extremity (Study 2) 
 
  Overall Conservatives Liberals 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Mild Liberal 
Issues 
Social safety 
net 
4.19 2.55 4.69a 2.48 3.96b 2.54 
Universal 
healthcare 
5.37 2.84 6.20a 2.75 5.00b 2.80 
Environmental 
protection 
policies 
3.88 2.86 4.74a 2.69 3.48b 2.85 
Equal rights for 
LGBTQ 
community 
3.95 3.17 5.03a 3.17 3.46b 3.06 
Mild 
Conservative 
Issues 
Reduced 
taxation 
4.30 2.48 4.33 2.62 4.29 2.42 
Limited 
government 
regulation 
4.68 2.51 4.11a 2.49 4.93b 2.48 
Nationwide gun 
rights 
5.45 2.78 5.06a 2.84 5.62b 2.74 
Supporting a 
strong military 
3.98 2.78 4.13 3.08 3.91 2.63 
Extreme 
Liberal Issues 
Restricting 
freedom of 
speech 
7.33 2.68 7.39 2.64 7.31 2.70 
Strictly 
enforcing 
political 
correctness 
7.34 2.77 7.60 2.75 7.22 2.77 
Affirmative 
Action quotas 
that prioritize 
race over merit 
6.00 2.86 6.84a 2.70 5.62b 2.85 
Prioritizing safe 
spaces 
5.27 3.01 6.35a 3.04 4.77b 2.86 
Extreme 
Conservative 
Issues 
Construction of 
The Wall 
7.44 2.76 6.16a 2.67 8.01b 2.61 
De-funding 
public school 
system 
7.70 2.79 6.98a 2.92 8.02b 2.67 
Outlawing 
abortion (even 
for rape and 
incest) 
7.72 2.89 6.71a 3.09 8.20b 2.68 
Discriminating 
against some 
groups 
7.91 2.84 7.34a 2.92 8.17b 2.77 
Note: Subscripts denote significant differences between score, at the p = .05 level or smaller. 
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Table 10: 
Complete Percentage Scores for Personal Agreement, Estimated Liberal Agreement, and 
Estimated Conservative Agreement with Partisan Issues (Study 2) 
 
  
% of 
Liberals: 
Personal  
Agreement 
% of 
Cons: 
Personal 
Agreement 
Liberal % 
Agree 
Estimate by 
Conservatives 
Liberal 
% Agree 
Estimate 
by 
Liberals 
Conservative 
% Agree 
Estimate by 
Liberals 
Conservative 
% Agree 
Estimate by 
Conservatives 
Mild Liberal 
Issues 
Social safety 
net 
89% 62% 79% 82% 25% 40% 
Universal 
healthcare 
87% 33.5% 82% 80% 24% 30% 
Environmental 
protection 
policies 
94% 57% 79% 84% 30% 41% 
Equal rights 
for LGBTQ 
community 
93% 59% 86% 86% 28% 36% 
Mild 
Conservative 
Issues 
Reduced 
taxation 
61% 88% 41% 50% 69% 72% 
Limited 
government 
regulation 
30% 80% 29% 33% 68% 76% 
Nationwide 
gun rights 
40.5% 87.5% 27% 28% 80% 80% 
Supporting a 
strong military 
56% 94% 36% 43% 83% 85% 
Extreme 
Liberal 
Issues 
Restricting 
freedom of 
speech 
13% 18% 50% 29% 44% 30% 
Strictly 
enforcing 
political 
correctness 
24.5% 17% 65% 41% 32% 26% 
Affirmative 
Action quotas 
that prioritize 
race over merit 
31% 14% 70% 52% 18% 21% 
Prioritizing 
safe spaces 
67% 27% 77% 69% 17% 25% 
Extreme 
Conservative 
Issues 
Construction 
of The Wall 
9.5% 73.5% 17% 11% 68% 74% 
De-funding 
public school 
system 
5.5% 28.5% 19% 11% 51% 41% 
Outlawing 
abortion (even 
for rape and 
incest) 
8% 48% 18% 12% 66% 63% 
Discriminating 
against some 
groups 
5.5% 21% 16% 10% 51% 35% 
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Table 11: 
Comparisons between Conservative’s Personal Agreement with The Wall and other Extreme 
Items (Study 2) 
      95% CI 
 Mean SD df t p Lower Upper 
De-Funding 
Schools 
2.61 1.50 223 -17.36 .000 -1.94 -1.54 
Outlawing 
Abortion 
3.53 1.81 220 -6.70 .000 -1.06 -.58 
Discrimination 2.34 1.56 220 -18.93 .000 -2.21 -1.80 
Note: The test value was 4.35, the mean conservative agreement score for The Wall.  
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Table 12: 
Degree of Over-estimation between Personal Agreement and In-group Estimation, and between 
In-group and Out-group Estimation for Extreme Liberal Issues (Study 2) 
 
 
Liberal Agreement 
Estimates by 
Liberals 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
Restricting 
Freedom of 
Speech, Personal 
Agreement (13%) 
28.85 28.24 12.39 486 <.001 13.34 18.37 
Enforcing PC, 
Personal 
Agreement 
(24.5%) 
41.31 30.65 12.15 490 <.001 14.09 19.52 
Affirmative 
Action, Personal 
Agreement (31%) 
52.33 27.85 16.94 488 <.001 18.86 23.81 
Safe Spaces, 
Personal 
Agreement (67%) 
68.68 25.32 1.48 500 .138 -.54 3.90 
 
 
Liberal Agreement 
Estimates by 
Conservatives 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
Restricting 
Freedom of 
Speech, Liberal 
Estimates 
(28.85%) 
50.32 36.35 8.86 224 <.001 16.69 26.24 
Enforcing PC 
Test Value, 
Liberal Estimates 
(41.31%) 
64.51 32.93 10.55 223 <.001 18.86 27.53 
Affirmative 
Action, Liberal 
Estimates 
(52.33%) 
70.47 27.85 9.79 225 <.001 14.49 21.79 
Safe Spaces, 
Liberal Estimates 
(68.68%) 
76.92 24.29 5.093 224. <.001 5.06 11.44 
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Table 13: 
Degree of Over-estimation between Personal Agreement and In-group Estimation, and between 
In-group and Out-group Estimation for Extreme Conservatives Issues (Study 2) 
 
 
Conservative 
Agreement 
Estimates by 
Conservatives 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
The Wall, 
Personal 
Agreement 
(73.5%) 
74.07 21/80 .394 225 .694 -2.28 3.43 
Defunding School, 
Personal 
Agreement 
(28.5%) 
40.63 28.87 6.29 223 <.001 8.32 15.93 
Outlawing 
Abortion, Personal 
Agreement (48%) 
63.22 28.48 8.00 223 <.001 11.47 18.97 
Discrimination, 
Personal 
Agreement (21%) 
35.17 30.02 7.05 222 <.001 10.21 18.14 
 
 
Conservative 
Agreement 
Estimates by 
Liberals 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
The Wall, Con 
Estimates 
(74.07%) 
67.84 24.01 -5.79 497 <.001 -8.35 -4.12 
Defunding School, 
Con Estimates 
(40.63%) 
51.46 26.04 9.29 498 <.001 8.54 13.12 
Outlawing 
Abortion, Con 
Estimates 
(63.22%) 
66.18 26.15 3.28 500 .001 1.55 6.14 
Discrimination, 
Con Estimates 
(35.17%) 
50.98 28.87 12.23 498 <.001 13.27 18.35 
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Table 14:  
Liking of Opposing Political Party and Willingness to Engage (Study 2) 
   
Engagement Items  
Conservative 
Liking of Liberals 
Liberal Liking of 
Conservatives 
Political Discussion 
r .040 .108* 
p .552 .018 
N 225 483 
Child’s Engagement 
to Opp. PP 
r .338** .256** 
p .000 .000 
N 227 483 
Going on a Date 
r .298** .385** 
p .000 .000 
N 226 481 
Shaking Hands 
r .259** .302** 
p .000 .000 
N 227 484 
Sharing a Taxi 
r .307** .298** 
p .000 .000 
N 227 485 
Engagement 
Composite 
r .373** .391** 
p .000 .000 
N 227 486 
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Table 15: 
Liberal Estimates of Conservative Agreement, and Willingness to Engage (Study 2) 
 
  
Political 
Discussion 
Child’s 
Engagement 
to Opp. PP 
Going on a 
Date 
Shaking 
Hands 
Sharing a 
Taxi 
Engagement 
Composite 
Perceived 
Agreement with 
Mild Conservative 
Issues 
r .144** -.111* -.133** .190** .236** .072 
p .001 .014 .003 .000 .000 .110 
N 497 498 495 499 500 501 
Perceived 
Agreement with 
Extreme 
Conservative 
Issues 
r -.027 -.053 -.078 -.068 -.079 -.091* 
p .552 .240 .084 .131 .076 .042 
N 497 498 495 499 500 501 
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Table 16: 
Conservative Estimates of Liberal Agreement and Willingness to Engage (Study 2) 
 
  
Political 
Discussion 
Child’s 
Engagement 
to Opp. PP 
Going on a 
Date 
Shaking 
Hands 
Sharing a 
Taxi 
Engagement 
Composite 
Perceived Agreement 
with Mild Liberal 
Issues 
r .073 -.187** -.203** .246** .319** .032 
p .278 .005 .002 .000 .000 .631 
N 224 226 225 226 226 226 
Perceived Agreement 
with Extreme Liberal 
Issues 
r .079 -.141* -.110 .132* .129 .008 
p .240 .034 .101 .047 .054 .908 
N 224 226 225 226 226 226 
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Table 17: 
Willingness to Voice Opinion by Affiliation, Item, and Type (Study 2) 
     
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Affiliation Item Type Mean Std. Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Conservative 
Liberal Mild 4.043a .083 3.880 4.206 
 Extreme 3.583bd .105 3.377 3.790 
Conservative Mild 4.098a .091 3.919 4.277 
 Extreme 3.595b .108 3.382 3.808 
Liberal 
Liberal Mild 4.367c .056 4.257 4.476 
 Extreme 3.579d .071 3.440 3.718 
Conservative Mild 3.827d .061 3.707 3.948 
 Extreme 4.262c .073 4.119 4.405 
Note: Subscripts denote significant differences between score, at the p = .05 level or smaller. 
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Table 18:  
Media Consumption and Perceived Agreement Estimations (Study 2) 
 
ML –Lib 
Agreement 
MC – Con 
Agreement 
EL – Lib 
Agreement 
EC – Con 
Agreement 
Watches 
FOX News  
r -.067 -.037 .170** .019 
p .077 .323 .000 .620 
N 702 702 702 702 
Watches 
MSNBC 
r -.060 -.007 -.025 .117** 
p .115 .859 .510 .002 
N 702 702 702 702 
Note: this was controlling for political affiliation. 
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Table 19: 
Media Consumption and Perceived Agreement, by Item (Study 2) 
 
Watches 
MSNBC 
Watches FOX 
News 
Social safety net - Perceived 
Liberal Agreement 
r -.055 -.056 
p .157 .154 
N 659 659 
Reduced taxation – 
Perceived Conservative 
Agreement 
r .030 -.025 
p .438 .515 
N 659 659 
Restricting freedom of 
speech – Perceived Liberal 
Agreement 
r -.014 .137** 
p .717 .000 
N 659 659 
Construction of The Wall – 
Perceived Conservative 
Agreement 
r -.030 .027 
p .440 .487 
N 659 659 
Universal healthcare – 
Perceived Liberal Agreement 
r -.037 .000 
p .338 .991 
N 659 659 
Limited government 
regulation – Perceived 
Conservative Agreement 
r .022 -.007 
p .570 .848 
N 659 659 
Strictly enforcing political 
correctness – Perceived 
Liberal Agreement 
r -.005 .149** 
p .899 .000 
N 659 659 
De-funding public school 
system – Perceived 
Conservative Agreement 
r .127** .103 
p .001 .008 
N 659 659 
Environmental protection 
policies – Perceived Liberal 
Agreement 
r -.059 -.025 
p .127 .521 
N 659 659 
Nationwide gun rights – 
Perceived Conservative 
Agreement 
r -.036 -.061 
p .355 .116 
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N 659 659 
Affirmative Action quotas 
that prioritize race over merit 
– Perceived Liberal 
Agreement 
r -.043 .096* 
p .265 .014 
N 659 659 
Outlawing abortion (even for 
rape and incest) – Perceived 
Conservative Agreement 
r .010 -.033 
p .806 .402 
N 659 659 
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community – Perceived 
Liberal Agreement 
r -.099* -.093* 
p .011 .017 
N 659 659 
Supporting a strong military 
– Perceived Conservative 
Agreement 
r -.070 -.061 
p .072 .117 
N 659 659 
Prioritizing safe spaces – 
Perceived Liberal Agreement 
r -.037 .026 
p .342 .511 
N 659 659 
Discriminating against some 
groups – Perceived 
Conservative Agreement 
r .140** .034 
p .000 .383 
N 659 659 
Note: this was controlling for political affiliation.  
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Table 20:  
Complete Percentage Scores for Personal Agreement, Estimated Liberal Agreement, and 
Estimated Conservative Agreement with Partisan Issue (Study 3) 
 
  
% of 
Liberals: 
Personal  
Agreement 
% of 
Cons: 
Personal 
Agreement 
Liberal % 
Agree 
Estimate by 
Conservatives 
Liberal 
% Agree 
Estimate 
by 
Liberals 
Conservative 
% Agree 
Estimate by 
Liberals 
Conservative 
% Agree 
Estimate by 
Conservatives 
Mild Liberal 
Issues 
Social safety 
net 
91% 59% 78% 80% 29% 40% 
Universal 
healthcare 
86% 39% 79% 77% 26% 29% 
Environmental 
protection 
policies 
94% 57% 79% 83% 35% 37.5% 
Equal rights 
for LGBTQ 
community 
93% 56% 85% 84.5% 31% 39% 
Mild 
Conservative 
Issues 
Reduced 
taxation 
58% 85% 38.5% 51% 71% 75% 
Limited 
government 
regulation 
33% 70% 33% 34% 66% 63% 
Nationwide 
gun rights 
39% 80% 26% 30% 77% 78% 
Supporting a 
strong military 
55% 86% 35% 48.5% 84% 80% 
Limiting 
Abortion 
25% 61% 32% 24% 65% 56% 
Extreme 
Liberal 
Issues 
Restricting 
freedom of 
speech 
22% 19% 57% 32% 40% 27.5% 
Strictly 
enforcing 
political 
correctness 
29% 22% 69.5% 41% 29% 25% 
Affirmative 
Action quotas 
that prioritize 
race over merit 
31% 13% 73% 48% 18% 22% 
Ensuring 
people have 
"safe spaces" 
for anything 
offensive 
32% 17% 74% 49% 22% 20% 
Extreme 
Conservative 
Issues 
Forcing 
immigrants in 
DACA to leave 
America 
14% 62% 19% 16.5% 66% 67% 
De-funding 
public school 
system 
10% 33% 22% 13% 50% 35% 
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Outlawing 
abortion (even 
for rape and 
incest) 
6.5% 47% 15% 12% 61.5% 56% 
Discriminating 
against some 
groups 
8% 28% 20% 13% 53% 34.5% 
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Table 21: 
Degree of Over-estimation between Personal Agreement and In-group Estimation, and between 
In-group and Out-group Estimation for Extreme Liberal Issues (Study 3) 
 
 
Liberal Agreement 
Estimates by 
Liberals 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
Restricting 
Freedom of 
Speech, Personal 
Agreement (22%) 
31.95 27.87 4.63 167 <.001 5.71 14.20 
Enforcing PC, 
Personal 
Agreement (29%) 
41.39 29.45 5.42 165 <.001 7.88 16.90 
Affirmative 
Action, Personal 
Agreement (31%) 
47.75 27.66 7.82 166 <.001 12.53 20.98 
Safe Spaces, 
Personal 
Agreement (32%) 
48.76 27.97 7.79 168 <.001 12.51 21.00 
 
 
Liberal Agreement 
Estimates by 
Conservatives 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
Restricting 
Freedom of 
Speech, Liberal 
Estimates 
(31.95%) 
57.07 31.29 7.95 97 <.001 18.85 31.39 
Enforcing PC, 
Liberal Estimates 
(41.39%) 
69.46 29.03 9.52 96 <.001 22.22 33.92 
Affirmative 
Action, Liberal 
Estimates 
(47.75%) 
72.62 26.87 9.11 96 <.001 19.45 30.28 
Safe Spaces, 
Liberal Estimates 
(48.76%) 
74.19 25.21 9.93 96 <.001 20.34 30.51 
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Table 22: 
Degree of Over-estimation between Personal Agreement and In-group Estimation, and between 
In-group and Out-group Estimation for Extreme Conservative Issues (Study 3) 
 
 
Conservative 
Agreement 
Estimates By 
Conservatives 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
DACA, Personal 
Agreement (62%) 
67.02 23.20 2.21 96 .029 .53 9.88 
Defunding School, 
Personal 
Agreement (33%) 
35.16 26.17 .815 96 .417 -3.11 7.44 
Outlawing 
Abortion, Personal 
Agreement (47%) 
55.81 29.69 2.94 97 .004 2.85 14.76 
Discrimination, 
Personal 
Agreement (28%) 
34.46 26.46 2.41 96 .018 1.13 11.79 
 
 
Conservative 
Agreement 
Estimates by 
Liberals 
   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean SD t df p Lower Upper 
DACA, Con 
Estimate (67.02%) 
66.14 24.66 -.466 168 .642 -4.63 2.86 
Defunding School, 
Con Estimate 
(35.16%) 
49.85 27.90 6.85 168 <.001 10.46 18.93 
Outlawing 
Abortion, Con 
Estimate 55.81% 
61.48 28.00 2.63 168 .009 1.42 9.92 
Discrimination, 
Con Estimate 
(34.46%) 
54.42 29.06 8.93 168 <.001 15.55 24.38 
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Table 23: 
Regression Model for Liberal Liking by Conservatives, Mild Items (Study 3) 
Liking  B SE t df p 95% CI 
Liberal Liking by Conservatives       
Step 1        
 
Liberal Agreement 
Estimates 
-.175 .125 -1.736 95 .086 [-.464, .031] 
Step 2        
 
Liberal Agreement 
Estimates 
-.095 .128 -.915 94 .363 [-.371, .137] 
 Personal Agreement .275 2.364 2.482 94 .015 [1.173, 10.562] 
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Table 24: 
Regression Model for Conservative Liking by Liberals, Mild Items (Study 3) 
Liking  B SE t df p 95% CI 
Conservative Liking by Liberals       
Step 1        
 
Conservative Agreement 
Estimates 
-.189 .084 -2.479 165 .014 [-.375, -.042] 
Step 2        
 
Conservative Agreement 
Estimates 
-.058 .079 -.806 164 .421 [-.219, .092] 
 Personal Agreement .462 1.611 6.462 164 <.001 [7.230, 13.592] 
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Table 25: 
Regression Model for Liberal Liking by Conservatives, Extreme Items (Study 3) 
Liking  B SE t df p 95% CI 
Liberal Liking by Conservatives       
Step 1        
 
Liberal Agreement 
Estimates 
-.449 .098 -4.877 94 <.001 [-.672, -.283] 
Step 2        
 
Liberal Agreement 
Estimates 
-.465 .111 -4.438 93 <.001 [-.715, -.273] 
 Personal Agreement -.033 2.181 -.311 93 .756 [-5.011, 3.653] 
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Table 26: 
Regression Model for Conservative Liking by Liberals, Extreme Items (Study 3) 
Liking  B SE t df p 95% CI 
Conservative Liking by Liberals       
Step 1        
 
Conservative Agreement 
Estimates 
-.279 .072 -3.700 162 <.001 [-.406, -.124] 
Step 2        
 
Conservative Agreement 
Estimates 
-.242 .067 -3.442 161 .001 [-.361, -.098] 
 Personal Agreement .371 1.563 5.284 161 <.001 [5.171, 11.343] 
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Table 27: 
Liking of Opposing Political Party Members, and Attribution of Liking to Stance on Issues 
(Study 3) 
 
 
 Liking Based on Mild 
Issues 
Liking Based on Extreme 
Issues 
Liberal Liking by 
Conservatives 
r -.137 -.222* 
p .180 .030 
N 97 96 
Conservative Liking by 
Liberals 
r -.073 -.273** 
p .348 .000 
N 167 167 
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Table 28:  
Liking of Opposing Political Party and Willingness to Engage (Study 3) 
   
 
 
  
Engagement Items  
Conservative 
Liking of Liberals 
Liberal Liking of 
Conservatives 
Political Discussion 
r .083 .238
** 
p .428 .002 
N 94 167 
Child’s Engagement 
to Opp. PP 
r .299** .379** 
p .003 .000 
N 96 167 
Going on a Date 
r .288** .446** 
p .004 .000 
N 97 166 
Shaking Hands 
r .191 .145 
p .061 .062 
N 97 167 
Sharing a Taxi 
r .232* .161* 
p .022 .038 
N 97 167 
Engagement 
Composite 
r .307** .404** 
p .002 .000 
N 97 167 
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Table 29: 
Liberal Estimation of Conservative Agreement and Willingness to Engage (Study 3) 
 
  
Political 
Discussion 
Child’s 
Engagement 
to Opp. PP 
Going on a 
Date 
Shaking 
Hands 
Sharing a 
Taxi 
Engagement 
Composite 
Perceived 
Agreement with 
Mild Conservative 
Issues 
r -.004 -.078 -.186* .236** .246** .033 
p .958 .316 .016 .002 .001 .675 
N 169 169 168 169 169 169 
Perceived 
Agreement with 
Extreme 
Conservative 
Issues 
r -.130 -.159* -.230** -.021 -.024 -.173* 
p .092 .039 .003 .788 .757 .024 
N 169 169 168 169 169 169 
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Table 30: 
Conservative Estimation of Liberal Agreement and Willingness to Engage (Study 3) 
 
  
Political 
Discussion 
Child’s 
Engagement 
to Opp. PP 
Going on a 
Date 
Shaking 
Hands 
Sharing a 
Taxi 
Engagement 
Composite 
Perceived 
Agreement with 
Mild Liberal 
Issues 
r -.023 -.212* -.288** .410** .298** .036 
p .826 .037 .004 .000 .003 .727 
N 95 97 98 98 98 98 
Perceived 
Agreement with 
Extreme Liberal 
Issues 
r -.051 -.202* -.288** .188 .075 -.088 
p .623 .047 .004 .064 .462 .389 
N 95 97 98 98 98 98 
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Figure 1: 3-way interaction between issue type (party affiliation and extremity) and political 
affiliation, and liking attribution (Study 3)  
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Appendix A 
 
Study 1 Materials 
 
Definitions 
 
Before you get started, we would just like to take a moment to go over some definitions of words you 
may encounter during this survey. 
 
When we use the word liberal, we are referring to individuals who typically vote Democrat, the Green 
Party, or who don't necessarily vote, but hold liberal perspectives and opinions.  
 
When we use the word conservative, we are referring to individuals who typically vote Republican, have 
supported the Tea Party, or who don't necessarily vote, but hold conservative perspectives and opinions.  
People who typically vote Libertarian may align with some conservative views but not others.  
 
With this in mind, please hit the arrow button to continue. 
 
 
If I were to support a political party in the USA, I would support... 
• The Republican Party 
• The Democratic Party 
• The Libertarian Party 
• The Green Party 
• Other: _________ 
 
Using the scale below, please indicate the strength of your political affiliation. 
Not At All 
Affiliated 
     
Strongly 
Affiliated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Using the following slider bar, please indicate (by sliding the dot) the point that you believe best 
represents your overall political orientation. 
 
100% Liberal     100% Conservative 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you feel positively or negatively towards each issue. Scores of 0 
indicate greater negativity, and scores of 100 indicate greater positivity. Scores of 50 indicate that you 
feel neutral about the issue. 
 
 
Greater Negativity  Neutral  Greater Positivity 
Don’t 
Kno
w 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100  
Abortion 
 
 
Limited 
Government  
 
Military and 
National Security  
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Religion 
 
 
Welfare Benefits 
 
 
Gun Ownership 
 
 
Traditional 
Marriage  
 
Traditional 
Values  
 
LGBTQ Rights 
 
 
Business  
 
 
Patriotism 
 
 
Multiculturalism 
 
 
Environmental 
Protection  
 
Police 
 
 
Taxation 
 
 
Affirmative 
Action  
 
 
On average, on most societal topics, are you: 
• More conservative 
• More liberal 
• Both equally 
 
 
NPI 
 
Read each pair of statements below and place and select the one that comes closest to describing your 
feelings and beliefs about yourself. You may feel that neither statement describes you well, but pick the 
one that comes closest. 
 
1. ___ I really like to be the center of attention   
 ___ It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention   
   
2. ___ I am no better or no worse than most people 
 ___ I think I am a special person 
   
3. ___ Everybody likes to hear my stories   
 ___ Sometimes I tell good stories   
   
4. ___ I usually get the respect that I deserve   
 ___ I insist upon getting the respect that is due me   
   
5. ___ I don't mind following orders   
 ___ I like having authority over people   
   
6. ___ I am going to be a great person 
 ___ I hope I am going to be successful 
   
7. ___ People sometimes believe what I tell them   
 ___ I can make anybody believe anything I want them to   
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8. ___ I expect a great deal from other people   
 ___ I like to do things for other people   
   
9. ___ I like to be the center of attention   
 ___ I prefer to blend in with the crowd   
   
10. ___ I am much like everybody else   
 ___ I am an extraordinary person   
   
11. ___ I always know what I am doing   
 ___ Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing 
   
12. ___ I don't like it when I find myself manipulating people   
 ___ I find it easy to manipulate people   
   
13. ___ Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me   
 ___ People always seem to recognize my authority 
   
14. ___ I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so   
 ___ When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed   
   
15. ___ I try not to be a show off   
 ___ I am apt to show off if I get the chance   
   
16. ___ I am more capable than other people   
 ___ There is a lot that I can learn from other people 
 
 
Self-Esteem 
 
To what extent to you agree with the statement: I have high self-esteem. 
 
Very 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Very 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Mild Liberal Condition 
 
The following questionnaire asks you about beliefs held by people in society that may tend to identify 
with particular political parties. Please answer the questions below as honestly as possible. 
  
Individuals in the USA have expressed certain opinions regarding healthcare. Specifically, some 
people tend to believe that all US citizens have a right to universally affordable healthcare, 
provided by the government.  
  
Some people and groups agree with this, and some do not. Please indicate how strongly you agree with 
this belief and how strongly you think other people within different groups agree with this belief below. 
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1. I agree that all US citizens have a right to affordable healthcare provided by the government. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I think liberals in general agree that all US citizens have a right to affordable healthcare 
provided by the government. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Please estimate what percentage of liberals at least somewhat agree that all US citizens have a 
right to affordable healthcare provided by the government. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Liberals  
 
4. If a liberal does not support the view that all US citizens have a right to affordable healthcare 
provided by the government, other liberals are likely to judge them: 
 
Very Poorly   
Neither 
Well nor 
Poorly 
  Very Well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
5. I think conservatives in general agree that all US citizens have a right to affordable healthcare 
provided by the government. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. Please estimate what percentage of conservatives at least somewhat agree that all US citizens 
have a right to affordable healthcare provided by the government. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage of 
Conservatives  
 
 
The following questionnaire asks you about beliefs held by people in society that may tend to identify 
with particular political parties. Please answer the questions below as honestly as possible. 
  
Individuals in the USA have endorsed certain actions regarding healthcare. Specifically, some 
people have signed petitions in favor of providing US citizens universally affordable healthcare, 
provided by the government.  
  
Political False Polarization  109 
 
Some people and groups agree with this, and some do not. Please indicate how strongly you agree with 
this belief and how strongly you think other people within different groups agree with this belief below. 
 
1. I agree with the act of signing petitions in favor of affordable healthcare provided by the 
government, and think it is a legitimate act. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. I think liberals in general agree with the act of signing petitions in favor of affordable healthcare 
provided by the government, and think it is a legitimate act. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Please estimate what percentage of liberals at least somewhat agree with the act of signing 
petitions in favor of affordable healthcare provided by the government, and think it is a legitimate 
act. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Liberals  
 
 
4. I think conservatives in general agree with the act of signing petitions in favor of affordable 
healthcare provided by the government, and think it is a legitimate act. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Please estimate what percentage of conservatives at least somewhat agree with the act of signing 
petitions in favor of affordable healthcare provided by the government, and think it is a legitimate 
act. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage of 
Conservatives  
 
 
6. For liberals who disagree with the opinion in favor of affordable healthcare, how likely are they 
to voice their opinions on the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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7. For conservatives who disagree with the opinion in favor of affordable healthcare, how likely are 
they to voice their opinions on the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. How likely are you to voice your opinion on the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
9. Did you have any comments regarding this viewpoint that you would like to share? If so, please 
use the textbox below. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Mild Conservative Condition 
 
The following questionnaire asks you about beliefs held by people in society that may tend to identify 
with particular political parties. Please answer the questions below as honestly as possible. 
  
Individuals in the USA have expressed certain opinions regarding the right to gun ownership. 
Specifically, some people tend to believe that all US citizens have a right to purchase and own guns, 
in accordance with the Second Amendment.  
  
Some people and groups agree with this, and some do not. Please indicate how strongly you agree with 
this belief and how strongly you think other people within different groups agree with this belief below. 
 
1. I agree that all US citizens have a right to purchase and own guns, in accordance with the Second 
Amendment. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I think conservatives in general agree that all US citizens have a right to purchase and own guns, 
in accordance with the Second Amendment. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Please estimate what percentage of conservatives at least somewhat agree that all US citizens 
have a right to purchase and own guns, in accordance with the Second Amendment. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
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Percentage 
of Liberals  
 
4. If a conservative does not support the view that all US citizens have a right to purchase and own 
guns, in accordance with the Second Amendment, other conservatives are likely to judge them: 
Very Poorly   
Neither 
Well nor 
Poorly 
  Very Well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
5. I think liberals in general agree that all US citizens have a right to purchase and own guns, in 
accordance with the Second Amendment. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. Please estimate what percentage of liberals at least somewhat agree that all US citizens have a 
right to purchase and own guns, in accordance with the Second Amendment. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage of 
Conservatives  
 
 
The following questionnaire asks you about beliefs held by people in society that may tend to identify 
with particular political parties. Please answer the questions below as honestly as possible. 
  
Individuals in the USA have endorsed certain actions regarding the right to gun ownership. 
Specifically, some people tend to protest whenever a politician tries to implement greater 
restrictions on gun ownership/ stricter gun control.  
  
Some people and groups agree with this, and some do not. Please indicate how strongly you agree with 
this belief and how strongly you think other people within different groups agree with this belief below. 
 
1. I agree the act of protesting against stricter gun control and think it is a legitimate act. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. I think conservatives in general agree with the act of protesting against stricter gun control and 
think it is a legitimate act. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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3. Please estimate what percentage of conservatives at least somewhat agree with the act of 
protesting against stricter gun control and think it is a legitimate act. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Liberals  
 
 
4. I think liberals in general agree with the act of protesting against stricter gun control and think it 
is a legitimate act. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Please estimate what percentage of liberals at least somewhat agree with the act of protesting 
against stricter gun control and think it is a legitimate act. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage of 
Conservatives  
 
 
6. For conservatives who disagree with the opinion in favor of the right to own guns, how likely are 
they to voice their opinions on the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. For liberals who disagree with the opinion in favor of the right to own guns, how likely are they 
to voice their opinions on the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. How likely are you to voice your opinion on the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
9. Did you have any comments regarding this viewpoint that you would like to share? If so, please 
use the textbox below. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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Extreme Liberal Condition 
 
The following questionnaire asks you about beliefs held by people in society that may tend to identify 
with particular political parties. Please answer the questions below as honestly as possible. 
  
Individuals in the USA have sometimes prioritized political correctness over freedom of speech. 
Specifically, at times, public figures have expressed views (often conservative) that are controversial 
and offensive to oppressed groups in society.  Some people believe these public figures should be 
banned from speaking on college campuses. 
  
Some people and groups agree with this, and some do not. Please indicate how strongly you agree with 
this belief and how strongly you think other people within different groups agree with this belief below. 
 
1. I agree that that controversial (often conservative) public figures who may be offensive to 
oppressed groups should be banned from speaking on college campuses. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. I think liberals in general agree controversial (often conservative) public figures who may be 
offensive to oppressed groups should be banned from speaking on college campuses. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Please estimate what percentage of liberals at least somewhat agree that controversial (often 
conservative) public figures who may be offensive to oppressed groups should be banned from 
speaking on college campuses. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Liberals  
 
4. If a liberal does not support banning controversial speakers from college capuses, other liberals 
are likely to judge them: 
 
Very Poorly   
Neither 
Well nor 
Poorly 
  Very Well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
5. I think conservatives in general agree that controversial (often conservative) public figures who 
may be offensive to oppressed groups should be banned from speaking on college campuses. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. Please estimate what percentage of conservatives at least somewhat agree that that controversial 
(often conservative) public figures who may be offensive to oppressed groups should be banned 
from speaking on college campuses. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage of 
Conservatives  
 
 
The following questionnaire asks you about beliefs held by people in society that may tend to identify 
with particular political parties. Please answer the questions below as honestly as possible. 
  
Individuals in the USA have sometimes prioritized political correctness over freedom of speech. 
Specifically, at times, public figures have expressed views (often conservative) that are controversial 
and offensive to oppressed groups in society.  Some people have started violent protests in response 
to a controversial public figure being invited to speak at college campuses.  
  
Some people and groups agree with this, and some do not. Please indicate how strongly you agree with 
this belief and how strongly you think other people within different groups agree with this belief below. 
 
1. I agree with the act of protesting violently against controversial speakers, and think it is 
legitimate. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. I think liberals in general agree with the act of protesting violently against controversial 
speakers, and think it is legitimate. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Please estimate what percentage of liberals at least somewhat agree with the act of protesting 
violently against controversial speakers, and think it is legitimate. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Liberals  
 
 
4. I think conservatives in general agree with the act of protesting violently against controversial 
speakers, and think it is legitimate. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Please estimate what percentage of conservatives at least somewhat agree with the act of 
protesting violently against controversial speakers, and think it is legitimate. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage of 
Conservatives  
 
 
6. For liberals who disagree with the opinion in favor of banning controversial speakers, how likely 
are they to voice their opinions on the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. For conservatives who disagree with the opinion in favor of banning controversial speakers, how 
likely are they to voice their opinions on the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. How likely are you to voice your opinion on the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
9. Did you have any comments regarding this viewpoint that you would like to share? If so, please 
use the textbox below. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Extreme Conservative Condition 
 
The following questionnaire asks you about beliefs held by people in society that may tend to identify 
with particular political parties. Please answer the questions below as honestly as possible. 
  
Individuals in the USA have expressed certain opinions about people of certain ethnic backgrounds 
in their communities.  Specifically, some individuals have expressed hostile and unwelcoming 
attitudes toward those of Latino/Hispanic or Middle Eastern background, regardless of their 
citizenship status.   
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Some people and groups agree with this, and some do not. Please indicate how strongly you agree with 
this belief and how strongly you think other people within different groups agree with this belief below. 
 
1. I agree with expressing hostile and unwelcoming attitudes toward those of Latino/Hispanic or 
Middle Eastern background, regardless of their immigration status. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. I think conservatives in general agree with expressing hostile and unwelcoming attitudes toward 
those of Latino/Hispanic or Middle Eastern background, regardless of their immigration status. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Please estimate what percentage of conservatives at least somewhat agree with expressing 
hostile and unwelcoming attitudes toward those of Latino/Hispanic or Middle Eastern 
background, regardless of their immigration status. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Liberals  
 
4. If a conservative does not support the view that all US citizens have a right to purchase and own 
guns, in accordance with the Second Amendment, other conservatives are likely to judge them: 
Very Poorly   
Neither 
Well nor 
Poorly 
  Very Well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
5. I think liberals in general agree with expressing hostile and unwelcoming attitudes toward those 
of Latino/Hispanic or Middle Eastern background, regardless of their immigration status. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. Please estimate what percentage of liberals at least somewhat agree with expressing hostile and 
unwelcoming attitudes toward those of Latino/Hispanic or Middle Eastern background, regardless 
of their immigration status. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage of 
Conservatives  
 
 
Political False Polarization  117 
 
The following questionnaire asks you about beliefs held by people in society that may tend to identify 
with particular political parties. Please answer the questions below as honestly as possible. 
  
Individuals in the USA have endorsed certain actions toward people of certain ethnic backgrounds 
in their communities. Some have engaged in blatant discrimination and harassment against 
individuals with Latino/Hispanic and Middle Eastern backgrounds. In certain cases, this has led to 
verbal or physical aggression, regardless of their citizenship status. 
  
Some people and groups agree with this, and some do not. Please indicate how strongly you agree with 
this belief and how strongly you think other people within different groups agree with this belief below. 
 
1. I agree with the act of engaging in blatant discrimination and harassment against those with 
Latino/Hispanic and Middle Eastern backgrounds, and think it is a legitimate act. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. I think conservatives in general agree with the act of engaging in blatant discrimination and 
harassment against those with Latino/Hispanic and Middle Eastern backgrounds, and think it is a 
legitimate act. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Please estimate what percentage of conservatives at least somewhat agree with the act of 
engaging in blatant discrimination and harassment against those with Latino/Hispanic and Middle 
Eastern backgrounds, and think it is a legitimate act.. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Liberals  
 
 
4. I think liberals in general agree with the act of engaging in blatant discrimination and 
harassment against those with Latino/Hispanic and Middle Eastern backgrounds, and think it is a 
legitimate act. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Please estimate what percentage of liberals at least somewhat agree with the act of engaging in 
blatant discrimination and harassment against those with Latino/Hispanic and Middle Eastern 
backgrounds, and think it is a legitimate act. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage of 
Conservatives  
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6. For conservatives who disagree with expressing hostile and unwelcoming attitudes toward those 
of Latino/Hispanic or Middle Eastern background, how likely are they to voice their opinions on 
the subject? 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. For liberals who disagree with expressing hostile and unwelcoming attitudes toward those of 
Latino/Hispanic or Middle Eastern background, how likely are they to voice their opinions on 
the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. How likely are you to voice your opinion on the subject? 
 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
Moderately 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Moderately 
Likely 
Extremely 
Likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
9. Did you have any comments regarding this viewpoint that you would like to share? If so, please 
use the textbox below. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Personal Frequency Questions 
 
1. How frequently do you sign petitions in favor of affordable healthcare provided by the 
government? 
 
Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very Frequently 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. How frequently do you attend protests against stricter gun control laws? 
 
Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very Frequently 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. How frequently do you violently protest against controversial (often conservative) speakers being 
invited to speak at college campuses? 
 
Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very Frequently 
1 2 3 4 5 
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4. How frequently do you engage in blatant discrimination and harassment against those with 
Latino/ Hispanic and Middle Eastern backgrounds? 
 
Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very Frequently 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Frequency Questions 
 
1. How frequently do liberals sign petitions in favor of affordable healthcare provided by the 
government? 
 
Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very Frequently 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. How frequently do conservatives attend protests against stricter gun control laws? 
 
Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very Frequently 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. How frequently do liberals violently protest against controversial (often conservative) speakers 
being invited to speak at college campuses? 
 
Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very Frequently 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. How frequently do conservatives engage in blatant discrimination and harassment against those 
with Latino/ Hispanic and Middle Eastern backgrounds? 
 
Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently Very Frequently 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Social Vigilantism 
 
Rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements using the scale 
provided. 
 
(1: Disagree Very Strongly – 10: Agree Very Strongly) 
 
1. I feel as if it is my duty to enlighten other people.  
2. I feel that my ideas should be used to educate others.  
3. I feel a social obligation to voice my opinion.  
4. I need to win any argument about how people should live their lives. 
5. Those people who are more intelligent and informed have a responsibility to educate the people 
around them who are less intelligent and informed. 
6. I like to imagine myself in a position of authority so that I could make the important decisions 
around here. 
7. I try to get people to listen to me, because what I have to say makes a lot of sense. 
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8. Some people just believe stupid things. 
9. There are a lot of ignorant people in society. 
10. I think that some people need to be told that their point of view is wrong. 
11. If everyone saw things the way that I do, the world would be a better place. 
12. It frustrates me that many people fail to consider the finer points of an issue when they take a 
side. 
13. I often feel that other people do not base their opinions on good evidence. 
14. I frequently consider writing a “letter to the editor.” 
 
 
Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale 
 
Rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. 
 
Strongly Disagree Disagree 
Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. I feel small when others disagree with me on topics that are close to my heart. 
2. When someone contradicts my most important beliefs, it feels like a personal attack. 
3. When someone disagrees with ideas that are important to me, it feels as though I’m being 
attacked. 
4. I tend to feel threatened when others disagree with me on topics that are close to my heart. 
5. When someone disagrees with ideas that are important to me, it makes me feel insignificant. 
6. I am open to revising my important beliefs in the face of new information. 
7. I am willing to change my position on an important issue in the face of good reasons. 
8. I am willing to change my opinions on the basis of compelling reason. 
9. I have at times changed opinions that were important to me, when someone showed me I was 
wrong. 
10. I’m willing to change my mind once it’s made up about an important topic. 
11. I can respect others, even if I disagree with them in important ways. 
12. I can have great respect for someone, even when we don’t see eye-to-eye on important topics. 
13. Even when I disagree with others, I can recognize that they have sound points. 
14. I am willing to hear others out, even if I disagree with them. 
15. I welcome different ways of thinking about important topics. 
16. I respect that there are ways of making important decisions that are different from the way I make 
decisions. 
17. My ideas are usually better than other people’s ideas. 
18. For the most part, others have more to learn from me than I have to learn from them. 
19. When I am really confident in a belief, there is very little chance that belief is wrong. 
20. On important topics, I am not likely to be swayed by the viewpoints of others. 
21. I’d rather rely on my own knowledge about most topics than turn to others for expertise. 
22. Listening to perspectives of others seldom changes my important opinions. 
 
 
Collective Narcissism  
 
Please think about the political party you identify most with while responding to the items of the scale. 
 
(1: Totally Disagree – 6: Totally Agree) 
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1. I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of my group. 
2. My group deserves special treatment. 
3. I will never be satisfied until my group gets the recognition it deserves. 
4. I insist upon my group getting the respect that is due to it. 
5. It really makes me angry when others criticize my group. 
6. If my group had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place. 
7. I do not get upset when people do not notice the achievements of my group. 
8. Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my group. 
9. The true worth of my group is often misunderstood. 
 
 
Modern Racism Scale 
 
Please read and indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with these statements. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. Discrimination against racial minorities is no longer a problem in the United States. 
2. It is easy to understand the anger of racial minorities in the Unites States. 
3. Racial minorities have more influence than they ought to have. 
4. Racial minorities are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. 
5. Racial minorities should not push themselves where they are not wanted. 
6. Over the past few years, racial minorities have gotten more economically than they deserve. 
7. Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect to racial 
minorities then they deserve. 
 
 
Social Circle 
 
1. What percentage of your online social circle (individuals you interact with online) hold mostly 
liberal views? 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Social 
Circle 
 
 
2. What percentage of your online social circle (individuals you interact with online) hold mostly 
conservative views? 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Social 
Circle 
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3. What percentage of your in-person social circle (people you interact with on a daily basis) hold 
mostly liberal views? 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Social 
Circle 
 
 
4. What percentage of your in-person social circle (people you interact with on a daily basis) hold 
mostly conservative views? 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Social 
Circle 
 
 
 
Demographics and Media Consumption 
 
Please indicate your age: ________ 
 
Please indicate your gender: 
• Male 
• Female 
• Other: ______ 
 
Please indicate your country of residence: 
• Canada 
• United States 
• Other: ______ 
 
What country were you born in? __________________ 
 
 
From the following, please select the racial group with which you primarily identify. 
• White/Caucasian 
• Black/African American 
• Asian 
• Hispanic/ Latino 
• Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
• Aboriginal 
• American Indian/Alaska Native 
• Other: ___________ 
 
To which religion or worldview do you currently subscribe or belong? 
• Atheism 
• Agnostic 
• Baha'i 
• Buddhism 
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• Christianity 
• Hinduism 
• Islam 
• Jainism 
• Judaism 
• Sikhism 
• Wicca 
• Spiritual but not religious 
• Other: ______ 
• None 
• Prefer not to answer 
 
What is the highest level of education you have obtained? 
• Primary school 
• High school 
• College/University degree 
• Post-graduate degree 
• Prefer not to answer 
 
What is your combined annual household income? 
• Less than 15,000 
• 15,000 -- 29,999 
• 30,000 – 39,999 
• 40,000 – 49,999 
• 50,000 – 59,999 
• 60,000 – 69,999 
• 70,000 – 79,999 
• 80,000 – 89,999 
• 90,000 – 99,999 
• 100,000 --120,000 
• Over 120,000 
• Prefer not to disclose 
 
 
Which television news networks do you watch the most often? 
 
Click all that apply. 
 
• ABC News 
• Bloomberg Television 
• CBS News 
• CNBC 
• CNN 
• FOX News 
• HLN 
• MSNBC 
• NBC News 
• Other: _____________________ 
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Please list the name of the specific news program (television show) that you prefer to get your news from: 
_____________________________ 
 
How many hours a day do you spend on social media (e.g. Facebook, instagram, snapchat, etc.)? 
• 1 - 31 minutes 
• 31 minutes - 1 hour 
• 1 - 2 hours 
• 3 - 4 hours 
• 5 - 6 hours 
• More than 7 hours 
• I don't use social media 
 
How many hours a day do you spend reading online news (e.g. News websites like Breitbart, Fox, New 
York Times, or Washington Post)? 
• 1 - 31 minutes 
• 31 minutes - 1 hour 
• 1 - 2 hours 
• 3 - 4 hours 
• 5 - 6 hours 
• More than 7 hours 
• I don't read online news 
 
Please indicate the sources of online news you are most likely to read regularly: __________________ 
 
How many hours a day do you spend browsing online discussion boards and forums (e.g. 
Reddit)? 
• 1 - 31 minutes 
• 31 minutes - 1 hour 
• 1 - 2 hours 
• 3 - 4 hours 
• 5 - 6 hours 
• More than 7 hours 
• I don't browse discussion boards 
 
 
Comments 
 
Before you finish the survey, we did want to give you the opportunity to share some of your thoughts 
with us. 
 
Political issues, such as the ones we outlined in this study, are extremely complex. We tried (to the best of 
our abilities) to capture a number of aspects, from a number of political perspectives. However, we 
recognize that we may not have gotten the complete picture, and are interested in your ideas! 
 
Was there anything in particular you felt that we missed in this study? Please share your thoughts here: 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
END OF SURVEY 
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Appendix B 
 
Study 2 Materials 
 
Definitions 
 
Before you get started, we would just like to take a moment to go over some definitions of words you 
may encounter during this survey. 
 
When we use the word liberal, we are referring to individuals who typically vote Democrat, the Green 
Party, or who don't necessarily vote, but hold liberal perspectives and opinions.  
 
When we use the word conservative, we are referring to individuals who typically vote Republican, have 
supported the Tea Party, or who don't necessarily vote, but hold conservative perspectives and opinions.  
People who typically vote Libertarian may align with some conservative views but not others.  
 
With this in mind, please hit the arrow button to continue. 
 
 
If I were to support a political party in the USA, I would support... 
• The Republican Party 
• The Democratic Party 
• The Libertarian Party 
• The Green Party 
• Other: _________ 
 
 
Using the scale below, please indicate the strength of your political affiliation. 
 
Not At All 
Affiliated 
     
Strongly 
Affiliated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Using the following slider bar, please indicate (by sliding the dot) the point that you believe best 
represents your overall political orientation. 
 
100% Liberal     100% Conservative 
 
 
On average, on most societal topics, are you: 
• More conservative 
• More liberal 
• Both equally 
 
 
Social Desirability  
 
Read each item and decide whether it is true or false for you. 
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1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. (T/F) 
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way. (T/F) 
3. On a few occasions, I have given up something because I thought too little of my ability. (T/F) 
4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew 
they were right. (T/F) 
5. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. (T/F) 
6. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. (T/F) 
7. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. (T/F) 
8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. (T/F) 
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. (T/F) 
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. (T/F) 
11. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. (T/F) 
12. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings. (T/F) 
 
 
Partisan Issues 
 
Below are a number of issues on which opinions are divided. Some issues are more moderate and others 
more extreme. The issues described do not reflect the researchers' opinions; we simply want to give you a 
chance to express a full range of your views. 
 
Please indicate the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each one on the scale 
provided. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Social safety net for the poor or 
unemployed  
Reduced taxation 
 
Restricting freedom of speech 
(e.g., college campuses banning 
speakers with views that may be 
offensive) 
 
Construction of The Wall 
(Dividing USA and Mexico)  
Universal healthcare provided 
by government  
Limited government regulation 
in business, finance, and 
industry 
 
Strictly enforcing political 
correctness and punishing (e.g. 
public shaming, expulsion, 
firing)  those who violate it 
 
De-funding public school 
system  
Environmental protection 
policies  
Nationwide gun rights 
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Affirmative Action quotas that 
prioritize race over merit  
Outlawing abortion (even for 
rape and incest)  
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community  
Supporting a strong military and 
national defense  
Prioritizing safe spaces for 
oppressed groups  
Discriminating against some 
groups (eg. Muslims or Latin 
Americans) by denying service 
or employment 
 
 
 
Below are a number of issues on which opinions are divided. Please indicate what percentage of liberals 
at least somewhat agree with each one on the scale provided. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Social safety net for the 
poor or unemployed  
Reduced taxation  
Restricting freedom of 
speech (e.g., college 
campuses banning 
speakers with views that 
may be offensive) 
 
Construction of The Wall 
(Dividing USA and 
Mexico) 
 
Universal healthcare 
provided by government  
Limited government 
regulation in business, 
finance, and industry 
 
Strictly enforcing political 
correctness and punishing 
(e.g. public shaming, 
expulsion, firing)  those 
who violate it 
 
De-funding public school 
system  
Environmental protection 
policies  
Nationwide gun rights  
Affirmative Action quotas 
that prioritize race over 
merit 
 
Outlawing abortion (even 
for rape and incest)  
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community  
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Supporting a strong 
military and national 
defense 
 
Prioritizing safe spaces for 
oppressed groups  
Discriminating against 
some groups (eg. Muslims 
or Latin Americans) by 
denying service or 
employment 
 
 
 
Below are a number of issues on which opinions are divided. Please indicate what percentage of 
conservatives at least somewhat agree with each one on the scale provided. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Social safety net for the 
poor or unemployed  
Reduced taxation  
Restricting freedom of 
speech (e.g., college 
campuses banning 
speakers with views that 
may be offensive) 
 
Construction of The Wall 
(Dividing USA and 
Mexico) 
 
Universal healthcare 
provided by government  
Limited government 
regulation in business, 
finance, and industry 
 
Strictly enforcing political 
correctness and punishing 
(e.g. public shaming, 
expulsion, firing)  those 
who violate it 
 
De-funding public school 
system  
Environmental protection 
policies  
Nationwide gun rights  
Affirmative Action quotas 
that prioritize race over 
merit 
 
Outlawing abortion (even 
for rape and incest)  
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community  
Supporting a strong 
military and national 
defense 
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Prioritizing safe spaces for 
oppressed groups  
Discriminating against 
some groups (eg. Muslims 
or Latin Americans) by 
denying service or 
employment 
 
 
 
Consider the issues we've listed here. For each issue, please rate on the following scale how mild or 
extreme it would be to hold the position of "strongly agree" for that issue.   
 
 Very Mild  
Neither Mild nor 
Extreme 
 Very Extreme 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Social safety net for the 
poor or unemployed  
Reduced taxation  
Restricting freedom of 
speech (e.g., college 
campuses banning 
speakers with views that 
may be offensive) 
 
Construction of The Wall 
(Dividing USA and 
Mexico) 
 
Universal healthcare 
provided by government  
Limited government 
regulation in business, 
finance, and industry 
 
Strictly enforcing political 
correctness and punishing 
(e.g. public shaming, 
expulsion, firing)  those 
who violate it 
 
De-funding public school 
system  
Environmental protection 
policies  
Nationwide gun rights  
Affirmative Action quotas 
that prioritize race over 
merit 
 
Outlawing abortion (even 
for rape and incest)  
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community  
Supporting a strong 
military and national 
defense 
 
Prioritizing safe spaces for 
oppressed groups  
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Discriminating against 
some groups (eg. Muslims 
or Latin Americans) by 
denying service or 
employment 
 
 
 
Are there other partisan issues that liberals and conservatives feel strongly about that we've missed? 
Please list any you can think of here. 
 
Issues liberals feel strongly about: _____________ 
Issues conservatives feel strongly about: ___________ 
 
 
Voicing Opinion 
 
Imagine you are in a situation where you could publicly voice (in person or online) your personal 
opinion on each of the issues below. How likely would you be to voice your true personal opinion 
publicly? 
 
How willing would you be to voice your opinion publicly on the following issues: 
 
 
Completely 
Unwilling 
Moderately 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Willing 
Moderately 
Willing 
Completely 
Willing 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Social safety net for the 
poor or unemployed  
Reduced taxation 
 
Restricting freedom of 
speech (e.g., college 
campuses banning 
speakers with views that 
may be offensive) 
 
Construction of The Wall 
(Dividing USA and 
Mexico) 
 
Universal healthcare 
provided by government  
Limited government 
regulation in business, 
finance, and industry 
 
Strictly enforcing 
political correctness and 
punishing (e.g. public 
shaming, expulsion, 
firing)  those who violate 
it 
 
De-funding public school 
system  
Environmental protection 
policies  
Nationwide gun rights 
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Affirmative Action 
quotas that prioritize race 
over merit 
 
Outlawing abortion (even 
for rape and incest)  
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community  
Supporting a strong 
military and national 
defense 
 
Prioritizing safe spaces 
for oppressed groups  
Discriminating against 
some groups (eg. 
Muslims or Latin 
Americans) by denying 
service or employment 
 
 
 
Willingness to Engage 
 
Please respond to the following hypothetical scenarios as though they were happening in your life. If the 
circumstances reflect your actual life situation, respond based on what you would do. However if 
circumstances are different from your real life, please respond hypothetically regarding what you would 
do if you were actually in that situation. 
 
1. Imagine, hypothetically, that you have a chance to engage in political discussion on some of the 
topics listed previously. How willing would you be to have a political discussion with a 
committed member of the opposing political party (a liberal if you’re a conservative, and a 
conservative if you’re a liberal)? 
 
Extremely 
Unwilling 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Willing 
Willing 
Extremely 
Willing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
2. Imagine, hypothetically, that you have a young adult son or daughter. How negatively or 
positively would you feel if your child got engaged to a committed member of the opposing 
political party (a liberal if you’re a conservative, and a conservative if you’re a liberal)? 
 
Extremely 
Negatively 
Negatively 
Somewhat 
Negatively 
Somewhat 
Positively 
Positively 
Extremely 
Positively 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
3. Imagine, hypothetically, that you were interested in meeting potential dating partners. How 
willing would you be to go out on a date with a committed member of the opposing political 
party (a liberal if you’re a conservative, and a conservative if you’re a liberal)? 
 
Extremely 
Unwilling 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Willing 
Willing 
Extremely 
Willing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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4. How willing would you be to shake hands with a committed member of the opposing political 
party (a liberal if you’re a conservative, and a conservative if you’re a liberal)? 
 
Extremely 
Unwilling 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Willing 
Willing 
Extremely 
Willing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
5. How willing would you be to share a taxi with a committed member of the opposing political 
party (a liberal if you’re a conservative, and a conservative if you’re a liberal)? 
 
Extremely 
Unwilling 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Willing 
Willing 
Extremely 
Willing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Liking 
 
How much do you like liberals in general? 
 
Not At All Very Little Some Quite a Bit Very Much 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
What do you like about them? _____________ 
What do you dislike about them? ____________ 
 
 
How much do you like conservatives in general? 
 
Not At All Very Little Some Quite a Bit Very Much 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
What do you like about them? _____________ 
What do you dislike about them? ____________ 
 
 
Changing Minds 
 
1. Think about the previously listed issues. For the ones that you personally agreed with, what is the 
percent likelihood that you would change your mind about the issue (eg. if you initially agreed, 
how likely would you be to disagree) after a discussion with someone who holds the opposing 
view? 
 
Not Likely At All  
(0%) 
    
Entirely Likely  
(100%) 
 
 
2. Think about the previously listed issues. For the ones that you thought liberals agreed with, what 
is the percent likelihood a liberal would change their mind about the issue (eg. if they initially 
agreed, how likely would they be to disagree) after a discussion with a conservative? 
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Not Likely At All  
(0%) 
    
Entirely Likely  
(100%) 
 
 
3. Think about the previously listed issues. For the ones that you thought conservatives agreed with, 
what is the percent likelihood a conservative would change their mind about the issue (eg. if they 
initially agreed, how likely would they be to disagree) after a discussion with a liberal? 
 
Not Likely At All  
(0%) 
    
Entirely Likely  
(100%) 
 
 
 
Social Circle 
 
5. What percentage of your online social circle (individuals you interact with online) hold mostly 
liberal views? 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Social 
Circle 
 
 
6. What percentage of your online social circle (individuals you interact with online) hold mostly 
conservative views? 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Social 
Circle 
 
 
7. What percentage of your in-person social circle (people you interact with on a daily basis) hold 
mostly liberal views? 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Social 
Circle 
 
 
8. What percentage of your in-person social circle (people you interact with on a daily basis) hold 
mostly conservative views? 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Percentage 
of Social 
Circle 
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Voting Tactics 
 
Imagine the political party you most support was considering various tactics for winning the next 
election. Some were fair and honest (e.g., explaining their party policies in detail, explaining the 
shortcomings of the opposing party's policies). Others were strategically likely to increase success but 
dishonest or unfair (e.g., spreading falsehoods about opposing candidates, making efforts to restrict voting 
access for members of the opposing party). 
 
 
 
How much would you support the following tactics? 
 
(1: Not At All – 7: Extremely) 
 
1. Tactics that emphasize fairness and honesty regardless of likelihood of winning 
2. Tactics that emphasize winning regardless of fairness or honesty 
 
Imagine the political party you least support was considering various tactics for winning the next 
election. Some were fair and honest (e.g., explaining their party policies in detail, explaining the 
shortcomings of the opposing party's policies). Others were strategically likely to increase success but 
dishonest or unfair (e.g., spreading falsehoods about opposing candidates, making efforts to restrict voting 
access for members of the opposing party). 
 
How likely is it that your least supported political party will engage in each tactic? 
 
(1: Not At All Likely – 7: Extremely Likely) 
 
1. Tactics that emphasize fairness and honesty regardless of likelihood of winning 
2. Tactics that emphasize winning regardless of fairness or honesty 
 
 
Media Consumption 
 
How much time do you spend watching the following television news networks in a typical day? 
 
Never 
watch (0 
min) 
1-30 min 31 min-1 
hr 
1-2 hr 2.5-4 hrs 4.5-6 hrs 6.5 hrs or 
more 
 
1. ABC News 
2. MSNBC 
3. CBS News 
4. Fox News 
5. CNN 
6. Other: ____________ 
 
 
How would you categorize the political leaning of each of these news networks? 
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(Left-leaning – Centrist/ Unbiased – Right-leaning) 
 
1. ABC News 
2. MSNBC 
3. CBS News 
4. Fox News 
5. CNN 
6. Other (if you indicated one previously) 
 
 
Please list your 3 favorite sources of print or online news (Eg. New York Times, Brietbart, Huffington 
Post, etc.). You may leave these blank if you do not read print or online news. 
 
1. List your first source here: ________ 
2. List your second source here: _________ 
3. List your third source here: ________ 
 
 
How would you categorize the political leaning of each of the print or online news sources you listed? 
 
(Left-leaning – Centrist/ Unbiased – Right-leaning) 
 
1. (First source piped in) 
2. (Second source piped in) 
3. (Third source piped in) 
 
 
How many hours a day do you spend reading print or online news? 
 
Never 
watch (0 
min) 
1-30 min 31 min-1 
hr 
1-2 hr 2.5-4 hrs 4.5-6 hrs 6.5 hrs or 
more 
 
 
Please list your 3 favorite online social media or discussion boards (Eg. Reddit, US Message Board, 
twitter, Facebook, etc.) where you either read or discuss current events or politics. List only sites where 
you engage in news consumption or discussion, not sites devoted solely to other interests or social 
activity. You may leave these blank if you do not have preferred social media or discussion boards. 
 
1. List your first source here: ________ 
2. List your second source here: _________ 
3. List your third source here: ________ 
 
 
How would you categorize the political leaning of the current events discussed on each of the discussion 
board/ social media sources you listed? 
 
(Left-leaning – Centrist/ Unbiased – Right-leaning) 
 
1. (First source piped in) 
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2. (Second source piped in) 
3. (Third source piped in) 
 
 
Modern Racism vs Symbolic Racism Scale 
 
Please read the following statements, and think about what judgments you might make about a person 
who indicates that they at least somewhat agree with the statement. You may personally agree or 
disagree with the statements themselves; however we are asking you to indicate your impression of 
someone else who agrees with the statement. There are no right or wrong answers - we are simply 
interested in the range of impressions these statements make. 
 
Definitely 
Racist 
Probably 
Racist 
Unsure 
Probably Not 
Racist 
Definitely Not 
Racist 
 
If someone at least somewhat agrees with the [following] statement, would you classify them as a 
racist? 
 
1. "Everyone, regardless of what group they belong to (gender, race, religion, etc) should have equal 
rights under the law."     
2. "Discrimination against racial minorities is no longer a problem in the United States." 
3. "Racial minorities should not push themselves where they are not wanted." 
4. "It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if minorities would only try harder 
they could be just as well off as whites."     
5. "It is preferable for people to marry within their own racial group."    
 
 
Demographics 
 
Please indicate your age: ________ 
 
Please indicate your gender: 
• Male 
• Female 
• Other: ______ 
 
Please indicate your country of residence: 
• Canada 
• United States 
• Other: ______ 
 
What country were you born in? __________________ 
 
 
From the following, please select the racial group with which you primarily identify. 
• White/Caucasian 
• Black/African American 
• Asian 
• Hispanic/ Latino 
• Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
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• Aboriginal 
• American Indian/Alaska Native 
• Other: ___________ 
 
To which religion or worldview do you currently subscribe or belong? 
• Atheism 
• Agnostic 
• Baha'i 
• Buddhism 
• Christianity 
• Hinduism 
• Islam 
• Jainism 
• Judaism 
• Sikhism 
• Wicca 
• Spiritual but not religious 
• Other: ______ 
• None 
• Prefer not to answer 
 
What is the highest level of education you have obtained? 
• Primary school 
• High school 
• College/University degree 
• Post-graduate degree 
• Prefer not to answer 
 
What is your combined annual household income? 
• Less than 15,000 
• 15,000 -- 29,999 
• 30,000 – 39,999 
• 40,000 – 49,999 
• 50,000 – 59,999 
• 60,000 – 69,999 
• 70,000 – 79,999 
• 80,000 – 89,999 
• 90,000 – 99,999 
• 100,000 --120,000 
• Over 120,000 
• Prefer not to disclose 
 
 
Comments 
 
Before you finish the survey, we did want to give you the opportunity to share some of your thoughts 
with us. 
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Political issues, such as the ones we outlined in this study, are extremely complex. We tried (to the best of 
our abilities) to capture a number of aspects, from a number of political perspectives. However, we 
recognize that we may not have gotten the complete picture, and are interested in your ideas! 
 
Was there anything in particular you felt that we missed in this study? Please share your thoughts here: 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
END OF SURVEY 
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Appendix C 
 
Study 3 Materials 
 
Definitions 
 
Before you get started, we would just like to take a moment to go over some definitions of words you 
may encounter during this survey. 
 
When we use the word liberal, we are referring to individuals who typically vote Democrat, the Green 
Party, or who don't necessarily vote, but hold liberal perspectives and opinions.  
 
When we use the word conservative, we are referring to individuals who typically vote Republican, have 
supported the Tea Party, or who don't necessarily vote, but hold conservative perspectives and opinions.  
People who typically vote Libertarian may align with some conservative views but not others.  
 
With this in mind, please hit the arrow button to continue. 
 
 
If I were to support a political party in the USA, I would support... 
• The Republican Party 
• The Democratic Party 
• The Libertarian Party 
• The Green Party 
• Other: _________ 
 
 
Using the scale below, please indicate the strength of your political affiliation. 
 
Not At All 
Affiliated 
     
Strongly 
Affiliated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Using the following slider bar, please indicate (by sliding the dot) the point that you believe best 
represents your overall political orientation. 
 
100% Liberal     100% Conservative 
 
 
On average, on most societal topics, are you: 
• More conservative 
• More liberal 
• Both equally 
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Below are a number of issues on which opinions are divided. Some issues are more moderate and others 
more extreme. The issues described do not reflect the researchers' opinions; we simply want to give you a 
chance to express a full range of your views. 
 
Please indicate the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each one on the scale 
provided. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Social safety net for the poor or 
unemployed  
Reduced taxation 
 
Restricting freedom of speech 
(e.g., college campuses banning 
speakers with views that may be 
offensive) 
 
Forcing undocumented 
immigrants and children in the 
Dreamer/ DACA programs to 
leave America 
 
Universal healthcare provided 
by government  
Limited government regulation 
in business, finance, and 
industry 
 
Strictly enforcing political 
correctness and punishing (e.g. 
public shaming, expulsion, 
firing)  those who violate it 
 
De-funding public school 
system  
Environmental protection 
policies  
Nationwide gun rights 
 
Affirmative Action quotas that 
prioritize race over merit  
Imposing carefully considered 
limits on free access to abortion  
Outlawing abortion (even for 
rape and incest)  
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community  
Supporting a strong military and 
national defense  
Ensuring people have "safe 
spaces" and "trigger warnings" 
for anything even slightly 
offensive 
 
Discriminating against some 
groups (eg. Muslims or Latin 
Americans) by denying service 
or employment 
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Below are a number of issues on which opinions are divided. Please indicate what percentage of liberals 
at least somewhat agree with each one on the scale provided. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Social safety net for the 
poor or unemployed  
Reduced taxation  
Restricting freedom of 
speech (e.g., college 
campuses banning 
speakers with views that 
may be offensive) 
 
Forcing undocumented 
immigrants and children in 
the Dreamer/ DACA 
programs to leave America 
 
Universal healthcare 
provided by government  
Limited government 
regulation in business, 
finance, and industry 
 
Strictly enforcing political 
correctness and punishing 
(e.g. public shaming, 
expulsion, firing)  those 
who violate it 
 
De-funding public school 
system  
Environmental protection 
policies  
Nationwide gun rights  
Affirmative Action quotas 
that prioritize race over 
merit 
 
Imposing carefully 
considered limits on free 
access to abortion 
 
Outlawing abortion (even 
for rape and incest)  
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community  
Supporting a strong 
military and national 
defense 
 
Ensuring people have "safe 
spaces" and "trigger 
warnings" for anything 
even slightly offensive 
 
Discriminating against 
some groups (eg. Muslims 
or Latin Americans) by 
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denying service or 
employment 
 
 
Below are a number of issues on which opinions are divided. Please indicate what percentage of 
conservatives at least somewhat agree with each one on the scale provided. 
 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Social safety net for the 
poor or unemployed  
Reduced taxation  
Restricting freedom of 
speech (e.g., college 
campuses banning 
speakers with views that 
may be offensive) 
 
Forcing undocumented 
immigrants and children in 
the Dreamer/ DACA 
programs to leave America 
 
Universal healthcare 
provided by government  
Limited government 
regulation in business, 
finance, and industry 
 
Strictly enforcing political 
correctness and punishing 
(e.g. public shaming, 
expulsion, firing)  those 
who violate it 
 
De-funding public school 
system  
Environmental protection 
policies  
Nationwide gun rights  
Affirmative Action quotas 
that prioritize race over 
merit 
 
Imposing carefully 
considered limits on free 
access to abortion 
 
Outlawing abortion (even 
for rape and incest)  
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community  
Supporting a strong 
military and national 
defense 
 
Ensuring people have "safe 
spaces" and "trigger 
warnings" for anything 
even slightly offensive 
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Discriminating against 
some groups (eg. Muslims 
or Latin Americans) by 
denying service or 
employment 
 
 
 
Liking 
 
How much do you like liberals in general? 
 
Not At All  Very Much 
 
 
What do you like about them? _____________ 
What do you dislike about them? ____________ 
 
 
How much do you like conservatives in general? 
 
Not At All  Very Much 
 
 
What do you like about them? _____________ 
What do you dislike about them? ____________ 
 
 
Reason for Liking/ Disliking 
 
Sometimes our like or dislike of people hinges on their beliefs or attitudes on particular topics. Some of 
these beliefs or attitudes may have a bigger impact on our like or dislike than others. 
 
How much of your like or dislike for Liberals has to do with their position on the following issues?  
 
That is, if their position makes you like or dislike them more, then you would indicate a higher place on 
the scale. 
 
 None  
Very 
Much 
Social safety net for the poor or 
unemployed  
Reduced taxation 
 
Restricting freedom of speech 
(e.g., college campuses banning 
speakers with views that may be 
offensive) 
 
Forcing undocumented 
immigrants and children in the  
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Dreamer/ DACA programs to 
leave America 
Universal healthcare provided 
by government  
Limited government regulation 
in business, finance, and 
industry 
 
Strictly enforcing political 
correctness and punishing (e.g. 
public shaming, expulsion, 
firing)  those who violate it 
 
De-funding public school 
system  
Environmental protection 
policies  
Nationwide gun rights 
 
Affirmative Action quotas that 
prioritize race over merit  
Imposing carefully considered 
limits on free access to abortion  
Outlawing abortion (even for 
rape and incest)  
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community  
Supporting a strong military and 
national defense  
Ensuring people have "safe 
spaces" and "trigger warnings" 
for anything even slightly 
offensive 
 
Discriminating against some 
groups (eg. Muslims or Latin 
Americans) by denying service 
or employment 
 
 
 
How much of your like or dislike for Conservatives has to do with their position on the following issues? 
 
 None  
Very 
Much 
Social safety net for the poor or 
unemployed  
Reduced taxation 
 
Restricting freedom of speech 
(e.g., college campuses banning 
speakers with views that may be 
offensive) 
 
Forcing undocumented 
immigrants and children in the 
Dreamer/ DACA programs to 
leave America 
 
Universal healthcare provided 
by government  
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Limited government regulation 
in business, finance, and 
industry 
 
Strictly enforcing political 
correctness and punishing (e.g. 
public shaming, expulsion, 
firing)  those who violate it 
 
De-funding public school 
system  
Environmental protection 
policies  
Nationwide gun rights 
 
Affirmative Action quotas that 
prioritize race over merit  
Imposing carefully considered 
limits on free access to abortion  
Outlawing abortion (even for 
rape and incest)  
Equal rights for LGBTQ 
community  
Supporting a strong military and 
national defense  
Ensuring people have "safe 
spaces" and "trigger warnings" 
for anything even slightly 
offensive 
 
Discriminating against some 
groups (eg. Muslims or Latin 
Americans) by denying service 
or employment 
 
 
 
Willingness to Engage 
 
 
Please respond to the following hypothetical scenarios as though they were happening in your life. If the 
circumstances reflect your actual life situation, respond based on what you would do. However if 
circumstances are different from your real life, please respond hypothetically regarding what you would 
do if you were actually in that situation. 
 
6. Imagine, hypothetically, that you have a chance to engage in political discussion on some of the 
topics listed previously. How willing would you be to have a political discussion with a 
committed member of the opposing political party (a liberal if you’re a conservative, and a 
conservative if you’re a liberal)? 
 
Extremely 
Unwilling 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Willing 
Willing 
Extremely 
Willing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
7. Imagine, hypothetically, that you have a young adult son or daughter. How negatively or 
positively would you feel if your child got engaged to a committed member of the opposing 
political party (a liberal if you’re a conservative, and a conservative if you’re a liberal)? 
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Extremely 
Negatively 
Negatively 
Somewhat 
Negatively 
Somewhat 
Positively 
Positively 
Extremely 
Positively 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
8. Imagine, hypothetically, that you were interested in meeting potential dating partners. How 
willing would you be to go out on a date with a committed member of the opposing political 
party (a liberal if you’re a conservative, and a conservative if you’re a liberal)? 
 
Extremely 
Unwilling 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Willing 
Willing 
Extremely 
Willing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
9. How willing would you be to shake hands with a committed member of the opposing political 
party (a liberal if you’re a conservative, and a conservative if you’re a liberal)? 
 
Extremely 
Unwilling 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Willing 
Willing 
Extremely 
Willing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
10. How willing would you be to share a taxi with a committed member of the opposing political 
party (a liberal if you’re a conservative, and a conservative if you’re a liberal)? 
 
Extremely 
Unwilling 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Unwilling 
Somewhat 
Willing 
Willing 
Extremely 
Willing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Demographics 
 
Please indicate your age: ________ 
 
Please indicate your gender: 
• Male 
• Female 
• Other: ______ 
 
Please indicate your country of residence: 
• Canada 
• United States 
• Other: ______ 
 
What country were you born in? __________________ 
 
 
From the following, please select the racial group with which you primarily identify. 
• White/Caucasian 
• Black/African American 
• Asian 
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• Hispanic/ Latino 
• Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
• Aboriginal 
• American Indian/Alaska Native 
• Other: ___________ 
 
To which religion or worldview do you currently subscribe or belong? 
• Atheism 
• Agnostic 
• Baha'i 
• Buddhism 
• Christianity 
• Hinduism 
• Islam 
• Jainism 
• Judaism 
• Sikhism 
• Wicca 
• Spiritual but not religious 
• Other: ______ 
• None 
• Prefer not to answer 
 
What is the highest level of education you have obtained? 
• Primary school 
• High school 
• College/University degree 
• Post-graduate degree 
• Prefer not to answer 
 
What is your combined annual household income? 
• Less than 15,000 
• 15,000 -- 29,999 
• 30,000 – 39,999 
• 40,000 – 49,999 
• 50,000 – 59,999 
• 60,000 – 69,999 
• 70,000 – 79,999 
• 80,000 – 89,999 
• 90,000 – 99,999 
• 100,000 --120,000 
• Over 120,000 
• Prefer not to disclose 
 
 
Comments 
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Before you finish the survey, we did want to give you the opportunity to share some of your thoughts 
with us. 
 
Political issues, such as the ones we outlined in this study, are extremely complex. We tried (to the best of 
our abilities) to capture a number of aspects, from a number of political perspectives. However, we 
recognize that we may not have gotten the complete picture, and are interested in your ideas! 
 
Was there anything in particular you felt that we missed in this study? Please share your thoughts here: 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
END OF SURVEY 
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